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I.

INTRODUCTION

"The history of the world had taught [the Founding Fathers] that
what was done in the past might be attempted in the future."'
Presidents, like judges and lawyers, follow precedent.2 Shordy after
the al-Qaeda terrorist network attacked the United States on September
11, 2001, President George W. Bush recalled the military commission to
1. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).
2. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of
State, Authority of the President To Repel the Attack in Korea (July 3, 1950), 23 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 173, 173 (1950) (justifying President Harry S. Truman's use of force in Korean conflict partly on executive branch precedent).
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active duty after more than a half-century of dormancy.3 Relying on precedent established by President Franklin D, Roosevelt,4 President Bush issued a military order on November 13, 2001 ("Military Order")
authorizing military commissions-wartime military courts-to try sus-5
pected al-Qaeda members for their role in the September 11th attacks.
The Military Order ignited a firestorm of criticism over whether President
Bush exceeded his constitutional authority and acted in derogation of do6
mestic and international law.
This Comment examines the Military Order, both legally and historically, to determine whether military commissions lawfully may try al-Qaeda
7
members and the Taliban militia for alleged violations of the law of war.
Part II of this Comment describes the history of military commissions, tracing their evolution from the Mexican-American War through the September 11 th attacks.8 Part III sets forth an analytical framework for assessing
3. See generally NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATrAcGKS UPON THE UNITED
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2004) (describing events leading up to and

STATES, THE

including September lth attacks).
4. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial, MartialJustice, Full and Fair,N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 2001, at A27 (stating that similar to "presidents before him," President
George W. Bush established military commissions to try violations of law of war and
citing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's actions during World War II as particularly
apt precedent); see also Tim Golden, After Terror, A Secret Reuriting of Military Law,

N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al (reporting that President Roosevelt's precedent of
trying unlawful combatants by military commission was "model" for contemporary
law-of-war military commissions).
5. See President George W. Bush, Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism § 4, 3 C.F.R. 918, 919-20 (2002) [hereinafter Military Order] (authorizing use
of military commissions).
6. See David Glazier, Note, Kangaroo Court or Competent Tribunal?Judging the
21st Century Military Commission, 89 VA. L. REv. 2005, 2005-08 (2003) (noting widespread academic criticism of Military Order).
7. For an evaluation of the Bush administration's legal position and brief conclusions on the legality of President Bush's law-of-war military commissions, see
infra notes 187-269 and accompanying text. Although the Military Order was
drafted broadly, a variety of procedural regulations promulgated by the U.S. Department of Defense have significantly narrowed its contours. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't
of Defense, Military Commission Order No. 1, Proceduresfor Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Aug. 31,
2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/Sep2005/d20050902order.pdf ("implement[ing] policy, assign[ing] responsibilities, and prescrib[ing] procedures...
for trials before military commissions" pursuant to Military Order). By its express
terms, the Military Order applies to any person who "is or was a member of" alQaeda, thus Taliban detainees may be excluded from the Military Order's ambit.
See Military Order, supra note 5, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919 (defining persons subject to
Military Order). This Comment, however, also will examine whether military com-

missions may try Taliban detainees, as the President could decide to try captured
Taliban detainees under the common law of war or under a separate military
order.
8. For a discussion of the history of military commissions, see infra notes 13-92
and accompanying text.
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the lawfulness of all military commissions.' Part IV examines the Bush
administration's legal position regarding the trial of al-Qaeda and Taliban
detainees within this analytical framework. 10 Part V evaluates the Bush
administration's legal position to determine whether contemporary law-ofwar military commissions are lawful under constitutional, domestic and
international law."1 Finally, Part VI concludes that President Bush's lawof-war military commissions are an appropriate forum for trying violations
of the law of war in the "War on Terrorism" because they satisfy the analytical framework and are consistent with the Constitution, U.S. Supreme
12
Court precedent and domestic and international law.
II.

THE HISTORY OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

The United States Constitution has been described as "the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of
man." 13 It is the source of all federal government power and, therefore, it
is to the Constitution that one must turn first. 14 Although the Constitution contains no express language creating military commissions, numerous provisions can be interpreted as implicitly authorizing their use.' 5 In
9. For a discussion of the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, see infra
notes 93-113 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the Bush administration's legal position within the
Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, see infra notes 114-86 and accompanying
text.
11. For a critical evaluation of the Bush administration's legal position, see
infra notes 187-262 and accompanying text.
12. For conclusions on the analysis in this Comment, see infra notes 263-69
and accompanying text.
13. W.E. Gladstone, Kin Beyond Sea, 127 N. AM. REv. 179, 185 (1878).
14. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) ("Congress and the President,
like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution."); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring in result) (observing that "there is no law for the government of the citizens, the armies or the
navy of the United States, within American jurisdiction, which is not contained in
or derived from the Constitution").
15. See A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 834
(1948) (noting that Constitution provides abundant authority for military commissions); Thomas C. Marmon, Joseph E. Cooper & William P. Goodman, Military
Commissions 12 (Apr. 1953) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, The Judge Advocate
General's School) (on file with The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School Library, Charlottesville, Va.), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA438079 [hereinafter Marmon Thesis] ("Although military commissions are
not constitutional courts in the sense that they were expressly provided for in that
document, they exist under the Constitution."). Historically, military commissions
were said to derive their authority from two principal constitutional sources: (1)
Congress's power to "declare War" and (2) Congress's power to "raise and support
armies," each of which may be augmented by Congress's power to "define and
punish ...Offences against the Law of Nations" [hereinafter Offenses Clause]. See
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d rev. ed. 1920) [hereinafter WINTHROP] (enumerating constitutional provisions sanctioning military commissions). Subsequently, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held that military
commissions derive their authority primarily from the Offenses Clause. See In re

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 737

analyzing military commissions, the overarching question is whether the

power of Congress and the President to wage war is limited by Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.1 6 By
answering this question, one can determine whether President Bush's law17
of-war military commissions are lawful.
A.

The Four Types of MilitaryJurisdiction

Under the Constitution, four types of military jurisdiction exist: (1)
military law, (2) martial law, (3) military government and (4) the law of
war. 18 Military law governs the U.S. Armed Forces in peace and in war, at
home and abroad.1 9 Martial law is the military rule exercised by a state
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946). Congress also believes that military commissions
derive their authority from the Offenses Clause. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
WAR CRIMES ACT OF 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-698, at 7 (1996) (noting that "constitutional authority to enact federal criminal laws relating to the commission of war
crimes is undoubtedly the same as the authority to create military commissions").
16. See Military Commissions, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297, 310-11 (1865) (James
Speed, U.S. Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Speed Opinion] (observing that opponents of
military commissions challenge military commission jurisdiction on Article III and
Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds).
17. See id. at 311-13 (noting that military commissions must be consistent with
Constitution).
18. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2005 EDITION)

2(a)
(2005) [hereinafter MCM 2005] (setting forth four types of military jurisdiction).
The Supreme Court definitively described the first three forms of military jurisdiction in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 141-42 (Chase, C.J., concurring in result). The
fourth type of military jurisdiction-law of war jurisdiction-is founded upon the
law of war, which is "that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals." Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27-28. The law of war is also known as the "law of
armed conflict" or "international humanitarian law." See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS
OF WAR 1-2 (Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter DocuMENTS ON THE LAws OF WAR] (explaining use of different terms for same concept).

This Comment refers to this branch of international law as the "law of war" be-

cause it has been the traditional terminology employed by military commentators
and is the term the U.S. Armed Forces currently employ. See WINTHROP, supra note
15, at 773 (using and defining "law of war"); U.S. Dep't of Defense, Directive No.

2311.01 E, DoD Law of War Program 3.1 (May 9, 2006) (same); see also S. COMM.

ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST TERRORISM, S. EXEC.
REP. No. 109-3, at 4 (2005) (noting U.S. Armed Forces use term "law of war," not

"international humanitarian law"). The law of war is binding upon states and individuals, particularly members of a state's armed forces. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE
3(b) (1956) [hereinARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-10, THE LAw OF LAND WARFARE
after FM 27-10] (describing breadth of circumstances to which law of war applies).
19. See GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 304 (3d rev. ed. 1915) [hereinafter DAVIS] (providing definition of "mili-

tary law"); see also MCM 2005, supra note 18, 2(a)(1) (defining "military law" as
"that branch of the municipal law which regulates [a government's] military establishment"). The Constitution confides to Congress the power to enact laws governing the Armed Forces. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (granting Congress
power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces"). The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is the military law that
governs all of the Armed Forces. SeeAct of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, 108
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20
over its citizens during an emergency, such as a rebellion or an invasion.
Military government is the law implemented by a state over an enemy
state's territory and people. 2 1 Law of war jurisdiction is that authority ex22
ercised by a state over offenses against the international law of war.
These four types of military jurisdiction are enforced through military
23
tribunals known as courts-martial and military commissions.

Both general courts-martial and military commissions have jurisdiction to try violations of the law of war. 24 In U.S. Army ("Army") practice, a
("[U]nifying, consolidating, revising, and codifying the Articles of War, the Articles
for the Government of the Navy, and the disciplinary laws of the Coast Guard.").
The UCMJ is codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). For convenience, UCMJ
provisions will be cited by article in the text but by U.S. Code section in the
footnotes.
20. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 817 (providing definition of "martial
law"); see also MCM 2005, supra note 18, 2(a) (2) (defining "martial law" as "[a]
government temporarily governing the civil population within its territory or a portion of its territory through its military forces as necessity may require").
21. SeeWINTHROP, supra note 15, at 799 (providing definition of "military government"). See generally CHARLES E. MAGOON, REPORTS ON THE LAw OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN TERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION BY THE MILITARY FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1903) (collecting legal opinions concerning U.S.

military government during Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection).
22. See MCM 2005, supra note 18,
2(a)(4) (defining "law of war
jurisdiction").
23. See FM 27-10, supra note 18, 13 (listing military tribunals through which
Army exercises military jurisdiction); see also MCM 2005, supra note 18, 2(b) (adding courts of inquiry to this list of military tribunals).
24. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (providing that "[g]eneral courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war"); id. § 821
(giving military commissions concurrent jurisdiction over offenders or offenses
against law of war); see also FM 27-10, supra note 18, 1 505(d) (explaining that
violations of law of war are within jurisdiction of general courts-martial, military
commissions and international tribunals). Military commissions received concurrent law of war jurisdiction by statute in 1916, as evidenced by the testimony of
Army Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder. Specifically, during testimony
before the House Committee on Military Affairs on May 14, 1912, Brigadier General Crowder, urging adoption of a revision to the Articles of War, explained:
The next article, No. 15, is entirely new, and the reason for its insertion in
the code are these: In our war with Mexico two war courts were brought
into existence by orders of Gen. Scott, viz, the military commission and
the council of war. By the military commission Gen. Scott tried cases cognizable in time of peace by civil courts, and by the council of war he tried
offenses against the laws of war. The council of war did not survive the
Mexican War period, and in our subsequent wars its jurisdiction has been
taken over by the military commission, which during the Civil War period
tried more than 2,000 cases. While the military commission has not been
formally authorized by statute, its jurisdiction as a war court has been

upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is an institution of
the greatest importance in a period of war and should be preserved. In
the new code the jurisdiction of courts-martial has been somewhat amplified by the introduction of the phrase "Persons subject to military law."
There will be more instances in the future than in the past when the
jurisdiction of courts-martial will overlap that of the war courts, and the
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military commission is a "common law war court set up during periods of

hostilities, martial rule or military government as an instrumentality for
the more efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the

President." 25 A court-martial, on the other hand, is a military trial of a
member of the Armed Forces governed by the Uniform Code of Military

Justice (UCMJ).2 6 Historically, military commissions tried law of war viola27
tions because courts-martial did not possess law of war jurisdiction.

B.

Executive Military Commission Precedent

American history is replete with examples of military commissions
that have tried nation-state enemies and other persons who are not members of the Armed Forces. 28 These military commissions have been utilized during declared and undeclared wars, both inside and outside the
29
United States, and under each of the four forms of military jurisdiction.
In addition, military commissions have been convened by direct order of
the President of the United States, by military commanders representing
the President on the battlefield, and under the express direction of Congress. 30 Because military commissions are quintessentially war-courts, the
federal courts have had relatively few occasions to squarely address their

question would arise whether Congress having vested jurisdiction by statute the common law of war jurisdiction was not ousted. I wish to make it
perfectly plain by the new article that in such cases the jurisdiction of the
war court is concurrent.
Revision of the Articles of War: Hearing on H.R. 23628 Being a Project for the
Revision of the Articles of War Before the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 62d Cong.
28-29 (1912).
25. Marmon Thesis, supra note 15, at 3 (citation omitted); see also SpencerJ.
Crona & Neal A. Richardson, Justicefor War Criminals of Invisible Armies: A New Legal
and Military Approach to Terrorism, 21 OKLA. CIr U. L. REV. 349, 367 (1996) (defining "military commission" as "military court trial of an enemy belligerent on
charges of violation of the laws of war"); see Green, supra note 15, at 832 (describing military commission as "an arm of the military forces which has proved invaluable in dispensing justice during combat and occupation").
26. See Crona & Richardson, supra note 25, at 367-68 (defining term "courtmartial"); see also Henry Wager Halleck, Military Tribunals and TheirJurisdiction, 5
AM.J. INT'L L. 958, 966 (1911) ("[C]ourts-martial exist in peace and war, but military commissions are war courts and can exist only in time of war.").
27. See FM 27-10, supra note 18, 13 (noting that customary American military practice is to try offenders against law of war by military commission). Similarly, the customary Army practice is to try violations of Articles of War/UCMJ by
courts-martial. See Green, supra note 15, at 843 (setting forth customary practice
regarding courts-martial).
28. See infra notes 29-92 and accompanying text.
29. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 831-55 (tracing history of all species of
military commissions).
30. See id. at 835, 853-55 (explaining who may convene military commissions).
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legality; thus, military commission precedent is mostly executive, rather
31
than judicial, in nature.
1.

The Revolutionary War Through the Mexican-American War

Prior to 1847, the Army used ad-hoc military tribunals based on the
common law of war to try law of war violations. 32 During the American
Revolutionary War, the Army tried a variety of persons for violating the law
of war. 33 For example, numerous Americans were tried by American
courts-martial or examined before boards of general officers and sentenced to death for spying.3 4 Upon ratification of the Constitution, how31. See, e.g., Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13, 68 (1990) (noting that federal courts heard few
challenges to military commission jurisdiction during Civil War).
32. See WILLIAM E. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351
(3d rev. ed. 1914) (indicating military tribunals tried cases under common law of
war prior to Mexican-American War).
33. See Harold L. Kaplan, ConstitutionalLimitations on Trials by Military Commissions (pt. 1), 92 U. PA. L. REv. 119, 121 (1943) [hereinafter Kaplan I] (noting
MajorJohn Andre's case was first American trial of enemy soldier for violating law
of war). General George Washington convened a "Board of General Officers" to
inquire into Major Andre's case. See Gen. George Washington, Letter Order, Head
Quarters, Tappan, Sept. 29, 1780, in 20 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
101, 101 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1937) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON]
(appointing Board of General Officers to inquire into case). The Board reported
that Major Andre should "be considered as a Spy from the enemy, and that agreeable to the law and usage of nations, it is their opinion, he ought to suffer death."
PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS RESPECTING MAJOR JOHN ANDRE 13
(Phila., Francis Bailey 1780). Notably, Joshua Hett Smith, a New York lawyer and
Major Andre's confederate, was tried by court-martial; but, unlike Major Andre,
Smith was tried pursuant to two Continental Congress resolutions. See Gen.
George Washington, Letter Order, Head Quarters, Sept. 30, 1780, reprinted in 10
HIST. MAG. 1, 1 (Supp. 1 1866) (ordering trial of Joshua Hett Smith by general
court-martial). See generally THE TRIAL OF JOSHUA H. SMITH FOR ASSISTING THE ENEMY, TAPAr'N, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 1780, in 6 AMERICAN STATE TIALS 486-513
(John D. Lawson ed., 1916) (reprinting court-martial proceedings).
34. See Letter from Gen. George Washington to Maj. Gen. William Heath
(Jan. 12, 1777), in 6 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at 497, 497 (opining
that death sentence should be confirmed in connection with court-martial of
Daniel Strang, convicted of being spy); Gen. George Washington, General Orders,
Head Quarters, V. Forge, June 3, 1778, in 12 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note
33, at 14, 14 (indicating that Thomas Shanks was convicted by Board of General
Officers for being spy); Gen. George Washington, General Orders, Head Quarters,
Fredericksburgh, Oct. 23, 1778, in 13 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at
135, 139-40 (ordering death sentence be executed in court-martial of David Farnsworth andJohn Blair, convicted of being spies). In addition, General Washington
was aware that trying Americans by military tribunals rather than civilian courts was
of questionable legality, and he used this power sparingly. See Letter from Gen.
George Washington to Gov. William Livingston (Apr. 15, 1778), in 11 WRITINGS OF
WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at 262, 262-63 (entertaining doubts about trying civilians by courts-martial); Letter from Gen. George Washington to Col. Oliver Spencer (Apr. 9, 1779), in 14 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON, supra note 33, at 357, 357-58
(opining that Robert Land is not subject to military jurisdiction under Articles of
War of 1776).
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ever, the prevailing practice appeared to change, as the civil courts in the
Washington and Adams administrations tried individuals for treason, and
law of war jurisdiction was not invoked. 35 One exception occurred during
the War of 1812, in which some U.S. citizens were tried for violating the
law of war by acting as spies. 36 On the whole, however, the accused were
released by the civil courts on writs of habeas corpus or at the direction of
37
President James Madison.
The origin of today's military commissions can be traced directly to
Major General Winfield Scott, who created the "military commission" in
1847 during the Mexican-American War. 38 At the war's outset, a variety of
offenses-committed by and upon American soldiers, and Mexican
soldiers and civilians-went unpunished because no congressional law
criminalized acts committed in Mexico, and the Mexican courts could not
exercise jurisdiction because of the American occupation.3 9 In response
35. See OPPOSITION TO THE EXCISE LAw IN PENNSYLVANIA, reprinted in 1 AM.
STATE PAPERS: Misc. 83-113 (1834) (reporting treason trials during second Washington administration); TRLAL OF NORTHAMPTON INSURGENTS, in 12 ANNALS OF
CONG. app. at 1354-554 (1851) (cataloguing treason prosecutions during Adams
administration).

36. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 42 n.14 (1942) (listing examples); see also
Smith v. Shaw, 12Johns. 257, 265 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (holding U.S. citizen could
not be court-martialed for spying). But cf.ARREST AND TRIAL OF E.L. LOUALLIER,
H.R. Doc. No. 27-69 (3d Sess. 1843) (reprinting court-martial proceedings convened under martial law jurisdiction during War of 1812). Moreover, military
tribunals tried two persons for law of war violations in 1818. See THE TRIAL AND
EXECUTION OF ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRISTER, reprinted in 1 AM. STATE PAPERS: MIL.
AFF. 681, 721-34 (1832) (reprinting proceedings of special court-martial).
37. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President'sPower To Detain "Enemy Combatants": Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison'sForgotten War, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1567, 158085 (2004) (explaining detention and release of U.S. citizens). The official correspondence concerning these cases is illustrative of the Madison administration's
approach to punishing alleged violators of the law of war. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. Amos
Hall, General Orders, Head Quarters, Manchester, Niagara Frontier, Aug. 13,
1812, reprintedin 1 MIL. MONITOR 121 (Feb. 1, 1813) (suspending sentence of general court-martial in case of Elijah Clark, apprehended as spy, until pleasure of
President James Madison could be known); Letter from William Eustis, Sec'y of
War, to Maj. Gen. Amos Hall (Oct. 20, 1812), reprinted in id. at 122 (transmitting
President Madison's opinion on general court-martial of Elijah Clark that "the said
Clark being considered a citizen of the U. S. & not liable to be tried by a court
martial as a spy, the President is pleased to direct, that unless he should be arraigned by the civil court for treason ... he must be discharged"); Maj. Gen. Amos
Hall, General Orders, Consequent on the Opinion of the President, Bloomfield,
Dec. 2, 1812, reprinted in id. (ordering Elijah Clark released); see also Letter from
Commodore Isaac Chauncey to William Jones, Sec'y of the Navy (July 4, 1813),
reprinted in 1 AM. STATE PAPERS: MIL. AFF. 384 (1832) (reporting apprehension of
Samuel Stacey, an American citizen, as spy); Letter from John Armstrong, Sec'y of
War, to Sen. Joseph Anderson, Chairman, S. Military Comm. (July 26, 1813), reprinted in id. (reporting discharge of Samuel Stacey "on the ground that a citizen
cannot be considered as a spy").
38. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 832 (describing creation of military
commissions).
39. See Letter from Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor to the Adjutant General of the
Army (Oct. 6, 1846), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 30-60, at 430, 430 (1st Sess.
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to this jurisdictional gap, General Scott created military commissions to try
criminal cases until Congress could legislate on the matter. 40 Because
Congress did not act, General Scott unilaterally issued a military order
declaring that he would convene military commissions to try all persons
for crimes that otherwise would have been prosecuted, had the Mexican
criminal courts been functioning. 4 1 Consequently, many American generals operating in Mexico employed the military commission to enforce pub42
lic order.
1848) (reporting atrocities committed by Texas Volunteers in Mexico); Letter
from Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor to the Adjutant General of the Army (Oct. 11,
1846), reprinted in id. at 431,431 (requesting guidance in case of person accused of
murdering Mexican soldier in Mexico); Letter from W.L. Marcy, Sec'y of War, to
Maj. Gen. Zachary Taylor (Nov. 25, 1846), reprinted in id. at 369, 369-70 (ordering
person released from confinement, as "very serious doubts" were entertained as to
whether military tribunal could exercise jurisdiction).
40. See Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, Projet on Martial Law (Oct. 8, 1846), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 30-59, at 49 (1st Sess. 1848) (submitting draft letter,
discussing martial law and councils of war, to Secretary of War); Letter from W.L.
Marcy, Sec'y of War, to the President (Dec. 5, 1846), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 29-1,
at 46, 55-56 (2d Sess. 1846) (recommending that Congress pass legislation authorizing military tribunals to try offenses committed beyond limits of United States
and in territory occupied by U.S. Armed Forces); Letter from W.L. Marcy, Sec'y of
War, to Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott (Feb. 15, 1847), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No.
30-60, at 873, 874 (1st Sess. 1848) (reporting enactment of additional Article of
War unlikely because particular Senate committee chairman felt legislation unnecessary, "as the right to punish in such cases necessarily resulted from the condition
of things when an army is prosecuting hostilities in an enemy's country").
41. See Elbridge Colby, Courts-Martialand the Laws of War, 17 AM. J. INT'L L.
109, 110-111 (1923) (describing effect of General Orders, No. 20); see, e.g., Maj.
Gen. Winfield Scott, General Orders, No. 20, Head Quarters of the Army, Tampico, Feb. 19, 1847, in Book 411/2, Orders and Special Orders, Headquarters of the
Army, War With Mexico, 1847-1848; Orders and Circulars, 1797-1910; Records of
the Adjutant General's Office, 1780s-1917: Record Group 94 (Entry 44); Nat'l
Archives & Records Admin., Washington, D.C., at 139 [hereinafter BooK 411/2]
(authorizing trials by military commission); Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, General Orders, No. 190, Headquarters of the Army, Puebla, Mexico, June 26, 1847, in id. at
380, 380 (republishing General Orders, No. 20 "with important additions"); Maj.
Gen. Winfield Scott, General Orders, No. 287, Headquarters of the Army, National
Palace of Mexico, Sept. 17, 1847, in id. at 507, 507, and reprintedin H.R. ExEC. Doc.
No. 30-8, at 387, 387 (1st Sess. 1848) (same).
42. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. William 0. Butler, Orders No. 29, Head Quarters Army
of Mexico, Mexico, Mar. 19, 1848, in Nat'l Archives & Records Admin., Orders and
Special Orders Issued by Maj. Gen. William 0. Butler and Maj. Gen. William J.
Worth to the Army in Mexico 1848, microfilmed on Nat'l Archives Microfilm Publ'ns
No. T-1114 (appointing military commission); Maj. Gen. William 0. Butler, Orders
No. 33, Head Quarters Army of Mexico, Mexico, Mar. 22, 1848, in id. (same); Maj.
Gen. William J. Worth, Orders No. 20, Head Quarters Army of Mexico, Jalapa, July
8, 1848, in id. (same); Maj. Gen. William J. Worth, Orders No. 21, Head Quarters
Army of Mexico, Jalapa, July 8, 1848, in id. (approving judgment of military commission that tried U.S. soldiers for robbery and theft); Maj. Gen. William J. Worth,
Orders No. 22, Head Quarters Army of Mexico, Jalapa, July 9, 1848, in id. (approving judgment of military commission that tried U.S. soldiers for stealing); see WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 832 (noting that other generals, in addition to General
Scott, employed military commissions in Mexico).
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In addition to military commissions, General Scott created a second
species of wartime tribunal, known as a "council of war," to try offenses
against the law of war. 4 3 These councils of war were identical to military
commissions in composition and procedure, differing solely in the types of
offenses brought before them. 4 4 Thus, General Scott created two types of
war-courts to try criminal offenses in Mexico: (1) military commissions to
try crimes against the Army's military government and (2) councils of war
45
to try violations of the law of war.
2.

The Civil War Through World War I

During the Civil War, the two war-courts of the Mexican-American
War-the military commission and the council of war-were united into
one, taking the name of the former. 46 Military commanders in the field,
like their predecessors in Mexico, repeatedly utilized military commissions
to try law of war violations. 47 In fact, President Abraham Lincoln formally
sanctioned the use of military commissions by presidential proclamation. 48 Shortly thereafter, Union army orders declared that law of war of43. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 832-33 (noting that General Scott created
councils of war to try violations of law of war, and reporting that actual number of
such trials were few).
44. See id. at 832 (describing differences between military commissions and
councils of war). Generally, the charges preferred against persons before councils
of war were for enticing U.S. soldiers to desert the service of the United States, a
violation of the law of war. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, General Orders, No.
187, Headquarters of the Army, Puebla, June 24, 1847, in BOOK 411/2, supra note
41, at 376 (approving judgment of council of war that tried Mexican citizens for
persuading or endeavoring to procure desertion from Army); Maj. Gen. Winfield
Scott, General Orders, No. 22, Headquarters of the Army, Mexico, Jan. 19, 1848,
reprinted in AM. STAR (Mex.),Jan. 27, 1848, at 1 (same). General Scott previously
informed the Mexican people of his intention to try violations of the law of war by
military tribunal. See Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, Proclamation (Apr. 11, 1847), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 30-60, at 937, 937 (1st Sess. 1848) (proclaiming that
violators of law of war would be punished). The jurisdiction and procedure of
councils of war was defined by general order. See Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, General Orders, No. 372, Headquarters of the Army, Mexico, Dec. 12, 1847, in BOOK
411/2, supranote 41, at 629, 629 (establishing councils of war to try violations of law
of war and prescribing their jurisdiction and procedure).
45. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 832-33 (explaining differences between
military commissions and councils of war).
46. See id. at 834 (estimating number of military commission trials that took

place during Civil War as "upwards of two thousand cases"); see also MARK E. NEELY,
JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 168-73 (1991)
(asserting 4271 such trials took place).
47. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 835-38 (enumerating various military commission orders issued by American commanders in field).
48. See President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Sept. 24, 1862), reprintedin
13 Star. 730 (1862) (subjecting certain persons to trial by military commission).
Although this proclamation was based on martial law jurisdiction, President Lincoln, and his successor, President Andrew Johnson, also used law of war jurisdiction to try Confederate soldiers and southern sympathizers for violating the law of
war by acting as guerillas and spies. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 838 (describing offenses tried by military commissions during Civil War). For example,John Y.
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fenses were to be tried by military commission. 49 In this period, military
commissions tried more than two thousand cases. 50 The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, heard few of these cases because President Lincoln suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, making judicial review
51
impossible.
Beall of the Confederate Navy was tried by military commission for violating the
law of war and acting as a spy. See Maj. Gen. John A. Dix, General Orders, No. 17,
Headquarters Department of the East, New York City, Feb. 21, 1865, reprinted in 8
U.S. WAR DEP'T, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION

RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser.

OF THE OFFICIAL

2, at 279 (Washington,

Gov't Printing Office 1899) [hereinafter WAR OF THE REBELLION] (approving conviction). See generally TRIAL OF JOHN Y. BEALL, AS A SPY AND GUERRILLERO, BY MILITARY COMMISSION (New York, D. Appleton 1865) (printing transcript of military
commission proceedings and related orders). Further, Confederate soldiers were
convicted of unlawful warfare for fighting in civilian clothes. See Maj. Gen. Irvin
McDowell, General Orders, No. 52, Headquarters Department of the Pacific, San
Francisco, California, June 27, 1865, reprinted in 8 WAR OF THE REBELLION, supra,
ser. 2, at 674 (approving conviction of T.E. Hogg and other Confederate soldiers
for violating laws and usages of civilized warfare). A military commission also tried
Major Henry Wirz in 1865 for his role as the commander in charge of the Confederate POW camp in Andersonville, Ga. in which upwards of ten thousand Union
soldiers perished. See General Court-Martial Orders, No. 607, War Department,
Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, Nov. 6, 1865, reprintedin id. at 784 (approving conviction). See generally TIAL OF HENRY WIRz, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 40-23 (2d
Sess. 1867) (printing summary of transcript of military commission proceedings
and related orders); Lewis L. Laska &James M. Smith, 'Hell and the Devil': Andersonville and the Trial of Captain Henry Win, C.S.A., 1865, 68 MIL. L. REv. 77 (1975)
(analyzing trial). Moreover, a military tribunal convicted a sitting U.S. congressman for aiding the enemy. See General Court-Martial Orders, No. 260, War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, June 1, 1865, reprintedin 8 WAR
OF THE REBELLION, supra, ser. 2, at 632 (approving conviction but remitting sentence of Rep. Benjamin G. Harris). See generally HON. BENJAMIN G. HARRIS, H.R.
EXEC. Doc. No. 39-14 (1st Sess. 1866) (printing transcript of general court-martial
proceedings and related orders).
49. See General Orders, No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies
of the United States in the Field, War Department, Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in 3 WAR OF THE REBELLION, supra note 48, ser.
3, at 148 [hereinafter General Orders, No. 100]. General Orders, No. 100, prepared by Dr. Francis Lieber, served as the model for many other national military
manuals and led to the calling of the 1874 Brussels Conference on the laws and
customs of war, as well as the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907. See
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 18, at 12-13 (tracing impact of General Orders, No. 100). In addition to its international impact, General Orders, No.
100 directly supported President Lincoln's actions vis-i-vis military commissions
during the Civil War. See General Orders, No. 100, supra, 13 (stating that "military offenses which do not come within the [Articles of War] must be tried and
punished under the common law of war"); see also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
(1 Wall.) 243, 249 (1864) (agreeing with principle).
50. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 834 (estimating number of military commissions cases heard during Civil War).
51. See Chomsky, supra note 31, at 68 (discussing effect of suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus). Congress, months after President Lincoln suspended the writ under presidential authority, authorized the President to suspend
the writ by law. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755, 755 [hereinafter
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Although the roar of cannon-fire subsided and the rebellion finally
was subdued, military commissions continued trying cases during the Reconstruction period under express statutory authority. 2 The Army, however, relying on the common law of war, also tried certain non-state actors
by military commission during the 1860s and 1870s. 53 Thus entrenched
in military practice, the Army continued to utilize military commissions
during the Spanish-American War, 54 the Philippine Insurrection
that followed,5 5

the American

occupations of Haiti and Vera Cruz,

Habeas Corpus Act] (authorizing President to suspend privilege of writ of habeas

corpus).
52. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 853-56 (summarizing use of military commissions during Reconstruction era). Congress authorized military commanders
to convene military commissions if the civil authorities in the southern states
proved inadequate in administering the criminal justice system. See Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 153, §§ 3-4, 14 Stat. 428, 428-29 [hereinafter Reconstruction Act] (conferring power on military commanders to convene military commissions and prescribing their procedure).
These military commissions exercised military
government jurisdiction over the southern states. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at
846 (noting that Reconstruction Act inaugurated military government in southern
states). In their totality, Reconstruction-era military commissions tried approximately two hundred cases, none of which embraced violations of the law of war.
See id. at 853. Significantly, President Johnson, who sanctioned the use of military
commissions during the Civil War, vetoed the Reconstruction Act because he felt
that military tribunals could exist solely in time of war, which did not then exist.
See President AndrewJohnson, Veto Message (Mar. 2, 1867), reprinted in 6JAMES D.
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,
1789-1897, at 498, 505 (Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1897) [hereinafter
MESSAGES AND PAPERS] (objecting to Reconstruction Act because it "asserts a power
in Congress, in time of peace, to set aside the laws of peace and to substitute the
laws of war"). For an interesting example of a Reconstruction Act military commission, see General Court Martial Orders No. 41, Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 10, 1869 (on file with author) (upholding
military commission conviction of James Weaver for murder under authority of
Reconstruction Act).
53. See Chomsky, supra note 31, at 15-46 (describing conflict between Sioux/
Dakota Indians and Army, in which Army tried certain persons by military commission for violating law of war). A similar episode occurred with the Modoc Indians
in 1873. See The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 249-50 (1873)
(reciting facts). See generally PROCEEDINGS OF A MILITARY COMMISSION CONVENED AT
FORT KLAMATH, OREGON, FOR THE TRIAL OF MODOC PRISONERS, reprinted in H.R.
ExEc. Doc. No. 43-122, at 131-203 (1st Sess. 1874) (reprinting proceedings).
54. See Brig. Gen. Guy V. Henry, General Orders No. 27, Headquarters Department of Porto Rico, San Juan, Dec. 8, 1898 (on file with author) (appointing
military commissions to try bandits committing crimes in Puerto Rico); Ex parte
Ortiz, 100 F. 955, 963 (C.C.D. Minn. 1900) (upholding legality of military commission in Puerto Rico based on military governmentjurisdiction). "While the state of
war existed [Ortiz] might lawfully be tried by a military commission for offenses
committed." Id. at 962.
55. See Lester Nurick & Roger W. Barrett, Legality of GuerrillaForces Under the
Laws of War, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 574-78 (1946) (explaining use of military commissions during Philippine Insurrection); Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt, Proclamation
(Aug. 14, 1898), reprinted in 1 WAR DEP'T ANN. REP. pt. 7, at 104 (1901) (establishing military government in Philippines and creating military commissions). See
generally CHARGES OF CRUELTY, ETC., TO THE NATIVES OF THE PHILIPPINES, S. Doc.
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Mexico, 56 and during World War
3.

1.

749

57

World War II Through the Vietnam War

The military commission was used last during World War II, though it
remained a viable option for trying law of war offenses in subsequent conNo. 57-205, pt. 2 (1st Sess. 1902) (reprinting hundreds of military commission
general orders).
56. See John H. Russell, Commander of the United States Forces in Haiti,
Proclamation (May 26, 1921), reprinted in 2 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING
TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1922, at 558 (1938) (authorizing trials by military tribunals in Haiti); Letter from John H. Russell, High Comm'r
in Haiti, to William Phillips, Acting Sec'y of State (Sept. 6, 1922), reprinted in id. at
555 (discussing use of provost courts by American occupation in Haiti); Letter
from Charles E. Hughes, Sec'y of State, to John H. Russell, High Comm'r in Haiti
(Oct. 4, 1922), reprinted in id. at 559 (same); Willard B. Cowles, Universality ofJurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 212-15 (1945) (documenting use of
military commissions in Vera Cruz, Mex.).
57. See General Orders, No. 7, War Department, Washington, Jan. 17, 1918,
reprinted in Establishmentof MilitaryJustice: Hearings on S. 64 Before the S. Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Military Affairs, 66th Cong. 897, 898 (1919) (directing that records of
trials before military commissions convened by American Expeditionary Forces be
sent to Acting Judge Advocate General for review). Under this authority, the
American Expeditionary Forces sanctioned the use of military commissions. See
Gen. John J. Pershing, General Orders No. 225, G.H.Q., American Expeditionary
Forces, France, Dec. 10, 1918,
5 (on file with author) (providing that military
commissions could be convened for trial of inhabitants violating law of war or laws
of military government); Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory,
Orders No. 1, Advance General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces,
Treves, Germany, Dec. 13, 1918, reprinted in 4 I.L. HuNr, AMERICAN MILITARY GovERNMENT OF OCCUPIED GERMANY, 1918-1920: REPORT OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
CIVIL AFFAIRS, THIRD ARMY, AND AMERICAN FORCES IN GERMANY 10 (1943) (authoriz-

ing use of military commissions); Maj. Gen. J.T. Dickman, Letter of Instructions
No. 5, Civil Affairs: Procedure of Provost Courts, Dec. 24, 1918, reprinted in id. at 50
(directing that procedures used in military commissions would be, in substance,
same as in trials by general courts-martial). Significantly, the peace treaties ending
World War I also made provision for the trial of offenders against the law of war by
military tribunals. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with Germany arts. 228-229, June 28,
1919, 2 Bevans 43 (providing for trial of offenders against law of war by military
tribunals); Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria
arts. 173-174, Sept. 10, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 8 (same); Treaty of Peace Between
the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary arts. 157-158, June 4, 1920, 15 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1921) (same). With respect to Germany, the military tribunals
never initiated proceedings, as the defendants were tried before German criminal
courts. See, e.g., Judgment in the Case of Karl Heynen (2d Crim. Senate of Imperial Ct. of Justice at Leipzig, Germany 1921), reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 674
(1922). Domestically, in the United States, military tribunals tried two German
agents for spying. See Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356
(1918) (offering opinion on case of Lather Witcke, alias Pablo Waberski); see also
United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1920) (holding
German agent could be tried by naval court-martial for spying), appeal dismissedper
stipulation, 256 U.S. 705 (1921). Although the district court found the court-martial had jurisdiction to try Wessels, the Secretary of the Navy, at the insistence of
the Department of Justice, dismissed the court-martial proceedings, thereby making the appeal unnecessary. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL
OF MARTIAL LAW 138 n.31 (1940) (explaining subsequent history of Wessels).
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flicts. 5 8 During World War II, the United States convened military com-

missions domestically and abroad to try nation-state enemies for law of war
violations. 59 For example, the Army tried two groups of German saboteurs who landed on American shores in 1942 and 1944.60 Similarly, the
Allied Powers convened military tribunals within their respective spheres
of occupation in Germany, through the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 61

The United States also convened hundreds of military commissions without Allied participation. 62 Moreover, during the Korean War, the United
Nations authorized military commission trials, although they were never
used. 63 Finally, during the Vietnam War, the Army contemplated trying
members of the Armed Forces by military commission for law of war violations, but ultimately did not use these military commissions because of
64
political concerns.
58. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No.

10 (1949) (cataloging World War II war-crimes trials).
59. See Green, supra note 15, at 833 (describing use of U.S. military
commissions).

60. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942) (holding military commission
that tried Nazi saboteurs was lawful); Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432
(10th Cir. 1956) (same).
61. See Glazier, supra note 6, at 2062-73 (tracing history of World War II warcrimes trials). National military tribunals, acting under the authority of the Allied

Control Council in Germany, conducted the trials of lesser German war criminals.
See Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes
Against Peace and Against Humanity (Dec. 20, 1945), in 3 Official Gazette of the Control
Councilfor Germany 50 (Jan. 31, 1946). The International Military Tribunal sitting
at Nuremberg tried the major war criminals of the European axis under the authority of an international agreement concluded between the victorious Allies. See
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the

European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 3 Bevans 1238. The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East tried the major Japanese war
criminals, and was established by General Douglas MacArthur acting as Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. See Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Special Proclamation (Jan. 19, 1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (establishing Charter of
International Military Tribunal for Far East).
62. See Green, supra note 15, at 833 (noting that, during World War II, U.S.
military commissions tried persons in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and
Korea for acts of terrorism, subversive activity and law of war violations).
63. SeeJordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, CourtingIllegality] (reporting that
military commissions were created "on paper" but were "never activated" during
Korean conflict). These U.N. military commissions had jurisdiction to try law of
war violations. See Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Letter Order, File AG 000.5 (28 Oct
50) JA, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, Tokyo, Japan, Subject:
Trial of Accused War Criminals, Oct. 28, 1950, reprinted in JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 724 (1996) (authorizing trial
of persons accused of violating law of war in Korean conflict by military
commission).
64. See Paust, CourtingIllegality, supra note 63, at 2-4 (discussing Vietnam War-

era military commissions); see also Michael Getler, Viet Trials of Ex-GIs: 'Too Hot,'
WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1971, at Al (reporting that military commission trials of for-
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C. Judicial Military Commission Precedent
Three U.S. Supreme Court decisions speak directly to the legality of
military commissions. 6 5 Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in 2005 upheld the lawfulness of one of
President Bush's law-of-war military commissions. 66 Although these opinions do not set forth a precise test to determine the legality of all military
commissions, they delineate the outer limits of military commission
67
jurisdiction.
In Ex parte Milligan,68 a Civil War-era military commission convicted
Lambdin P. Milligan of conspiring against the United States and violating
the law of war. 69 The United States contended that Milligan could be
tried under martial law jurisdiction, but Milligan argued that the military
commission was unlawful because it derived its power solely from the President and expressly contravened the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863.70 The
Supreme Court, in freeing Milligan, held that the military commission

lacked jurisdiction because the Habeas Corpus Act specifically vested the
federal courts with jurisdiction over cases like Milligan's. 71 In addition,
the Court held that Congress lacked the constitutional power to authorize
72
military tribunals to try citizens not part of the Armed Forces.

mer U.S. servicemen for alleged war crimes committed in Vietnam would not be
pursued because issue was "too hot" politically).
65. For a discussion of three U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning military
commissions, see infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
66. For a discussion of the D.C. Circuit case upholding President Bush's lawof-war military commissions, see infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
67. For a discussion of the ways in which case-law modifies the Time-PersonOffense-Place Framework, see infra notes 68-89 and accompanying text.
68. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
69. See General Court-Martial Orders, No. 214, War Department, AdjutantGeneral's Office, Washington, May 2, 1865, reprinted in 8 WAR OF THE REBELLION,
supra note 48, ser. 2, at 543 (approving conviction of Lambdin P. Milligan).
70. See Argument for the United States, in Milligan, 71 U.S. at 13 (arguing that
military commission was exercising martial law jurisdiction); Argument for the Petitioner, in id. at 22 ("Whatever has been done in these cases, has been done by the
executive department alone."). Milligan further argued that because no act of Congress established his military commission, it "depended entirely upon the executive
will for its creation and support." Id. at 30.
71. See id. at 117 (holding Indiana circuit court had plenary jurisdiction over
Milligan's case). Moreover, the Court noted that the military commission was not
a court established by Congress. See id. at 121 (questioning power of military commission because it was not ordained by Congress).
72. See id. at 120-21 (holding Congress does not possess power to subject civilians to military trials). Four members of the Court, though concurring in the result on statutory grounds, disagreed with the Court's constitutional reasoning. See
id. at 134-35 (Chase, C.J., concurring in result) (finding military commission
lacked jurisdiction because case was brought "within the precise letter and intent"
of Congress). To the minority, therefore, the Habeas Corpus Act was controlling
and the majority's analysis properly should have ended without addressing the
constitutional issues. See id. at 136, 141. Because the majority did not so limit
itself, the minority also analyzed the issue of whether Congress could have author-
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Three-quarters of a century later, the Court ruled on the lawfulness of
military commission jurisdiction in Ex parte Quiin.7 3 The story of the
"Nazi saboteurs" is an oft-told tale. 74 In 1942, eight German agents were
dispatched to the United States via submarine to sabotage U.S. industrial
plants and railroads. 75 Upon landing on the coasts of New York and Florida, the agents removed their military uniforms and donned civilian clothing. 76 When the saboteurs were apprehended, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt issued a proclamation denying the saboteurs access to the
courts, and a military order convening a military commission to try the
agents for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War. 7 7 In
denying the saboteurs' petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court held
that the federal government, as a whole, had the power to try unlawful
78
enemy combatants for violating the law of war.
ized Milligan's trial by military commission. See id. at 13641. The minority concluded that Congress did indeed have that power. See id. at 137.
73. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
74. See Louis FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN
REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 91-126 (2005) (analyzing Quirin). See generally Louis FISHER, NAzI SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILITARY TRIBUNAL AND AMERICAN
LAW (2003) [hereinafter FISHER]; PIERCE O'DONNELL, IN TIME OF WAR: HITLER'S
TERRORIST ATTACK ON AMERICA (2005).
75. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21-22 (1942) (discussing facts); FISHER, supra note

74, at 18 (describing saboteurs' intended mission).
76. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22 (indicating that saboteurs buried their uniforms
and "proceeded in civilian dress").
77. See id. at 22-23 (discussing President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proclamation
and military order).
78. See id. at 28 (holding President and Congress were acting concurrently).
The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the President could convene

military commissions solely on his own constitutional authority. See id. at 29. In
addition, the Court drew the following distinction between lawful and unlawful
combatants: "Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners
of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful." Id. at 31. The
Army drew a similar distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants during
the Philippine Insurrection. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Proclamation
(Dec. 20, 1900), reprinted in 1 WAR DEP'T ANN. REP. pt. 4, at 91 (1901) (declaring
that certain persons would not be entitled to POW privileges). Some commentators, however, suggest that "unlawful belligerency" is actually "unprivileged bellig-

erency." See Richard R. Baxter, So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency' Spies, Guerrillas,
and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 343 (1951)

(arguing that "armed and

unarmed hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than those
entitled to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians merely deprive such
individuals of a protection they might otherwise enjoy under international law and
place them virtually at the power of the enemy"). Under the "unprivileged belligerency" theory, the Quirin saboteurs did not violate the law of war; rather, the
saboteurs simply could not assert the protections of the law of war. See id. at 340
(stating that while secret agents like Quirin saboteurs are subject to trial under
military common law, "the characterization of such conduct as a violation of international law arises, it is submitted, from a fundamental confusion between acts
punishable under international law and acts with respect to which international

law affords no protection").
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Again during World War II, the Court addressed the issue of law of
war jurisdiction in In re Yamashita.79 There, the Court considered whether
a military commission had jurisdiction to try ajapanese general for alleged
violations of the law of war.8 ° In upholding the use of military commissions, the Court found that the trial of "enemy combatants who have committed violations of the law of war is thus not only a part of the conduct of
war operating as a preventive measure against such violations, but is an
exercise of the authority sanctioned by Congress to administer the system
of military justice."8 1 The Court noted further that the "war power ... is
not limited to victories in the field, but carries with it the inherent power
to guard against the immediate renewal of the conflict."8 2 Thus, the
Court held that a military commission could try prisoners of war (POWs)
83
for violations of the law of war.
Finally, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 84 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held that a military commission convened pursuant to
President Bush's Military Order had jurisdiction to try a suspected alQaeda member for allegedly violating the law of war.8 5 In denying
Hamdan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals first
determined that President Bush's designation of a military commission to
79. 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding World War II-era military commission had
jurisdiction to try Japanese general, held as POW, for violating law of war).
80. See id. at 8 (stating issue presented to Court). General Yamashita was
charged with failing to stop his troops from committing atrocities in the then-occupied Philippines. See id. at 14-15.
81. Id. at 11.
82. Id. at 12.
83. See id. at 9 (holding military commission had jurisdiction to try General
Yamashita).
84. 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2005) (No. 05-184). The Court will decide whether (1) the President's military
commissions are duly authorized under the Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF], the UCMJ or
the inherent powers of the President and (2) detainees can obtain judicial enforcement of rights protected under the Third Geneva Convention by writ of habeas
corpus challenging the legality of their detention. See Questions Presented,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
qp/05-00184qp.pdf (last visited May 26, 2006). The Court heard oral argument on
March 28, 2006. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05184 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument transcripts/05-184.pdf. But see Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739 [hereinafter DTA] (containing provision that could possibly divest Court of jurisdiction in case); President
George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations To Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and
Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30,
2005) (construing DTA as removing jurisdiction from Court).
85. See Hamdan,415 F.3d at 35-36 (setting forth facts and procedural history).
Hamdan was made subject to the Military Order by presidential directive. See
Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Secretary of Defense (July 3,
2003), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/Dec2005/d20051215prtbHamdan.
pdf (determining that Salim Ahmed Hamdan is subject to Military Order).
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try Hamdan did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The court
found no separation of powers violation because Congress sanctioned
Hamdan's military commission through (1) its joint resolution of September 18, 2001 ("AUMF"), which authorized the use of military force against
those responsible for the September 11th attacks, (2) UCMJ Article 21 and
(3) UCMJ Article 36.86 Next, the court found that Hamdan was not entitled to POW status under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 1949 ("Third Geneva Convention") 8 7 because
the Third Geneva Convention does not apply to al-Qaeda and its members.88 Last, the court held that even if the Third Geneva Convention
applied to al-Qaeda or its members, and was judicially enforceable, the
trial of an enemy combatant, like Hamdan, by military commission does
not violate the Third Geneva Convention's terms. 89
Clearly, military commissions have enjoyed a rich history. 90 Nevertheless, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted, simply because "an unconstitu86. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 38 (holding President Bush's law-of-war military
commission was statutorily authorized). Here, the court relied on Yamashita for
the proposition that the trial and punishment of enemy combatants by military
commission is part of the "conduct of war." See id. at 37. Significantly, the court
found the distinction between a formally declared war and an authorization of
force to be immaterial. See id. at 37-38. Next, the court found that Article of War
15, which the Quiin Court held authorized the 1942 military commission of the
Nazi saboteurs, is materially similar to UCMJ Article 21. See id. at 38. As a result,
the court concluded, "it is impossible to see any basis for [the] claim that Congress
has not authorized military commissions." Id.
87. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention].
88. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40-41 (holding Hamdan does not qualify as POW
under Article 4 and that Third Geneva Convention does not apply to al-Qaeda or
its members). The court's POW analysis closely followed the reasoning of the January 22, 2002 OLC Opinion, infra note 121, in that the court first found that
Hamdan did not fit the Article 4 definition of a POW because Hamdan is not a
member of a group that purports to have complied with Article 4(A) (2) (b) or (d).
See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40 (arguing that Hamdan lacks Article 4 POW status because "he does not purport to be a member of a group who displayed a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance and who conducted their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war"). Next, the court concluded that the
Third Geneva Convention did not apply to al-Qaeda or its members. See id. at 41
(presenting "[a]nother problem" Hamdan faced). Here, the court reasoned that
Article 2 did not apply because al-Qaeda is neither a state nor a party to the convention. See id. (noting that Third Geneva Convention only contemplates two
types of armed conflict: "[A] 11cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties"). Thus,
Hamdan was not entitled to POW status. See id. (rejecting argument under exception to Article 2, which binds signatory states to Third Geneva Convention as long
as non-signatory power accepts and applies provisions of convention, by finding no
evidence to support notion that al-Qaeda had accepted or applied its provisions).
89. See id. at 40-42 (holding President Bush's law-of-war military commission
to be consistent with international law).
90. See supra notes 28-89 and accompanying text (tracing evolution of military
commissions).
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tional action has been taken before surely does not render that same
action any less unconstitutional at a later date." 9 1 Thus, while examining
these precedents is necessary to understand the military commission's role
in U.S. history, the outstanding question is whether past legal justifications
92
for military commissions continue to be viable in the twenty-first century.
III.

THE TIME-PERSON-OFFENSE-PLACE FRAMEWORK

Neither Congress nor the courts have adopted a comprehensive ana93
lytical framework to determine the legality of all military commissions.
Nevertheless, prior to the September 11th attacks, each of the three coordinate branches of government recognized the military commission as a
lawful war-court, through judicial opinions,9 4 acts of Congress 95 and orders and proclamations of the President,9 6 as well as opinions of the U.S.
91. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 546-47 (1969).
92. For a discussion of the continuing validity of law-of-war military commissions, see infra notes 93-262 and accompanying text.
93. See Harold L. Kaplan, ConstitutionalLimitations on Trials by Military Commissions (pt. 2), 92 U. PA. L. REv. 272, 272 (1944) [hereinafter Kaplan II] (noting lack
of guidance from Congress and courts).
94. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 834 (listing cases upholding military commissions); see also In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946) (upholding particular military commission and noting that Congress "recognized the 'military commission'
appointed by military command, as it had previously existed in United States Army practice, as an appropriate tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenses against the
law of war") (emphasis added).
95. See WIrrHROP, supra note 15, at 833-34 (enumerating congressional statutes recognizing military commissions); see also Act ofJune 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 7, 40
Stat. 217, 219 (saving military commission jurisdiction for offense of spying).
96. See President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Sept. 24, 1862), reprinted in
13 Stat. 730 (1862) (making all rebels and insurgents, and their aiders and abettors, subject to martial law and trial by court-martial or military commission); President Andrew Johnson, Military Order (May 1, 1865), reprinted in 6 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supra note 52, at 334 (ordering trial of Lincoln conspirators by military
commission); President AndrewJohnson, Proclamation (Apr. 2, 1866), reprinted in
14 Stat. 811 (1866) (declaring end of insurrection in certain states of Union and
opining that military tribunals may be used in cases of actual necessity, for suppressing insurrection or rebellion); President Andrew Johnson, Proclamation
(Aug. 20, 1866), reprinted in id. at 814 (announcing insurrection in Texas over, that
insurrection in United States was at end, and opining that military tribunals may
be used in cases of actual necessity, for suppressing insurrection or rebellion);
President Theodore Roosevelt, Proclamation (July 4, 1902), reprinted in 32 Stat.
2014 (granting amnesty to Philippine insurgents, except those convicted by military tribunals during insurrection); General Orders, No. 32, War Department,
Washington, June 4, 1920 (on file with author) (confirming and commuting sentence of Lather Witcke, alias Pablo Waberski, who was tried by military commission
in 1918 for spying); President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation No. 2561 (July
2, 1942), Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States, 7 Fed. Reg.
5101 (July 7, 1942); President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Military Order (July 2, 1942),
Appointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942); President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Military Order (Jan. 11, 1945), Governing the Establishment of
Military Commissionsfor the Trial of Certain Offenders Against the Law of War, and Governingthe ProcedureforSuch Commissions, 10 Fed. Reg. 549 (Jan. 16, 1945). President
Lincoln also issued military orders and proclamations concerning the trial of per-
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Attorneys General. 97 Congress, however, has never defined the military
sons by court-martial. See, e.g., President Abraham Lincoln, Military Order (Aug. 7,
1861), reprinted in 1 WAR OF THE REBELLION, supranote 48, ser. 3, at 390 (announcing that Article 57 of Articles of War of 1806, subjecting civilians to trial by courtmartial, would be enforced); President Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation (Mar. 17,
1865), reprinted in 13 Stat. 753 (1865) (directing arrest and trial by court-martial of
those who furnish arms to hostile Indians).
97. SeeJurisdiction of the Federal Judiciary, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 55, 58-59 (1848)
(noting that because particular military commission was dissolved, it could not assert jurisdiction); Murder of the President, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 215, 215 (1865)
(opining that assassins of President Lincoln could be tried by military commission); Military Commissions, id. at 297, 317 (same); Case of Jefferson Davis, id. at
411, 413 (1866) (noting that POWs, who had not been convicted by military commissions for violations of law of war, could be tried for treason in civil courts);
Milliken's Case, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 332, 335-36 (1867) (stating that military commission would not have jurisdiction to try former Confederate soldier for violating his
parole because peace prevailed); Case of James Weaver, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 59, 6667 (1869) (concluding that military commission had jurisdiction to try citizen of
Texas for murder under Reconstruction Act); The Modoc Indian Prisoners, 14
Op. Att'y Gen. 249, 253 (1873) (explaining that certain Modoc Indians could be
tried by military commission for violating law of war); Memorandum Opinion from
Cyrus Bussey, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Military Commissions (Aug.
7, 1890), in 4 U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DECISIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR IN CASES RELATING TO PENSION CLAIMS 103, 113 (George Baber ed., Washington, Gov't Printing Office 1891) (upholding legality of particular military commission); Cuba, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 120 (1900) (recognizing military commission as
war-court); Army Officer, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 570, 571 (1903) (finding that military
commission had no jurisdiction because peace had been proclaimed in Philippines); Trial of Spy by Court Martial, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 561, 561 (1919) (reversing
former Attorney General's opinion and holding, based upon newly discovered
facts, that military commission had jurisdiction to try alleged spy); Memorandum
from Robert E. Jordan, III, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Army, to the Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Trial of DischargedServicemen for Violation
of the Law of War 8 (Dec. 2, 1969) (on file with author) [hereinafter December 2,
1969 Department of the Army Memorandum] (suggesting that trial of former U.S.
soldiers by military commission, for violations of law of war committed in Vietnam,
would be lawful); see also Unlawful Traffic with Indians, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 470, 47172 (1871) (noting that persons charged with relieving enemy could be tried by
court-martial because state of war existed between United States and certain Indian tribes); Memorandum Opinion from Maj. Gen. E.M. Brannon,J. Advoc. Gen.
of the Army, Application for Relief Under Article of War 53 in the Case of Heinrich
Kaukoreit, HerbertAckermann, and Ernst Bald, Members of the German SurrenderedForces
(CM 302791) (Oct. 25, 1950), in MEMORANDUM OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF THE ARMY, 1949-1950, at 520, 524 (1951) (finding trial of German
soldiers by court-martial lawful). Similarly, the Attorney General of the Confederacy agreed that military tribunals were lawful in time of war. See Memorandum
Opinion from Wade Keyes, Att'y Gen. ad interim, Confederate States of America,
Jurisdictionof Courts Martial (Nov. 18, 1863), in THE OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, 1861-1865, at 352, 353-54 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 1950)
(opining that, under Confederate Constitution, alien enemies cannot claim right
to trial by jury for offenses committed during war and that they may be tried by
military tribunal for carrying on war without authorization from their government). But see Devlin's Claim, 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 128, 128 (1867) (determining
that military commission, sitting in Washington during Civil War, lacked jurisdiction to try citizen of New York not in military service); Trial of Spies by Military
Tribunals, 31 Op. Att'y Gen. 356, 365 (1918) (postulating that military commission
lacked jurisdiction to try alleged spy); Martial Law in Hawaii, 57 Interior Dec. 570,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss3/6

20

Thravalos: The Military Commission in the War on Terrorism

2006]

COMMENT

commission's jurisdictional contours.9 8 Moreover, the courts have yet to
set forth a precise test for evaluating the legality of all military
99
commissions.
As a result, the common law of war and the attendant rules that have
developed over time-as gleaned from judicial opinions, opinions of the
U.S. Attorneys General and Judge Advocates General, and authorities on
military law-can help determine the lawful scope of military commission
jurisdiction.1 0 0 These rules indicate that jurisdiction for all military commissions is divisible into four aspects: (1) time, (2) persons, (3) offenses
and (4) place ("Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework"), each of which
must be satisfied for a military commission to have jurisdiction under the
common law of war. 10 1
Therefore, for any military commission to be lawful, the military commission first must have 'jurisdiction in time," such as when martial law is
02
in effect, when military government exists or when war is being waged.
584 (1942) (finding trial of two civilians by military commission, acting under martial law jurisdiction, unlawful).
98. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 309 (indicating that "the statute law has failed
to define [military commissions'] authority, nor has it made provision in regard to
their constitution, composition, or procedure").
99. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347 (1952) ("Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute."); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1,45-46 (1942) ("We have no occasion now to define with meticulous care the
ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to the law of war.").
100. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 272 (noting that, because military commissions are not regulated by statute, recourse is had to law of war, as interpreted
by customs of U.S. government, to determine "proper circumstances" in which
military commissions are lawful).
101. See id. (setting forth analytical framework to evaluate legality of military
commission jurisdiction). Colonel William Winthrop, U.S. Army first created this
framework in 1886. See 2 WiLtaAm WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 65-74 (Washington,
W.H. Morrison 1886) (analyzing military commission jurisdiction in terms of time,
person, offense and place); see also WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 836-41 (restating
Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework in 1896). The U.S. Supreme Court described Colonel Winthrop as the "Blackstone of military law" and his impact on
military law endures to this day. See generally George S. Prugh, Jr., Colonel William
Winthrop: The Tradition of the Military Latyer, 42 A.B.A. J. 126 (1956) (tracing Colonel Winthrop's distinguished career). In addition to Colonel Winthrop, numerous
commentators have adopted this framework. See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 309-12;
CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAw OF MARTIAL RuLE §§ 52-53 (2d ed. 1943) [hereinafter
FAiRMAN]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THEJUDGE-ADvoCATES

GENERAL OF THE ARMy §§ 1680-81, 1691 (Charles McClure ed., rev. ed. 1901) [hereinafter 1901 JAG DIGEST]; Green, supra note 15, at 843-48.

102. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 273-74 (defining "jurisdiction in time criterion" and explaining that criterion can be satisfied when war is being waged); see
also WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 837-38 (noting military commissions must assume
jurisdiction within "period of war"); DAVIS, supra note 19, at 309-10 (stating military
commissions must assume jurisdiction during "time of war"); FAIRMAN, supra note
101, § 52 (same); 1901 JAG DIGEST, supra note 101, § 1691 (same); Green, supra
note 15, at 848 (observing that military commissions may assume jurisdiction in
time until ratification of treaty of peace).
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Second, the military commission must have 'jurisdiction over the person,"
such as those individuals subject to the UCMJ or persons who are subject
to trial by military tribunals under the law of war. 10 3 Third, the military
commission must have 'jurisdiction over the offense" alleged, which includes crimes tried by the civilian courts when functioning normally, violations of military orders over which courts-martial do not have statutory
jurisdiction and violations of the law of war. 10 4 Last, the military commission must have 'jurisdiction over the place," such as territory that is under
martial law, enemy territory that is subject to military government, or territory that is located within the "theatre or zone of operations." 10 5 If all
four jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied, the military commission is
10 6
lawful under the common law of war and Army practice.
103. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 274-79 (defining "jurisdiction over persons criterion" and noting that criterion embraces persons subject to military law
under Articles of War and civilians under specified circumstances); see also WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 838 (noting that members of enemy's army are amenable
to trial by military commission for violations of law of war); DAVIs, supra note 19, at
309 (opining that both military persons and civilians are amenable to military commission jurisdiction); FAIRMAN, supra note 101, § 53 (noting that persons not subject to military law are amenable to trial by military commission); 1901 JAG DIGEST,
supra note 101, § 1680 (stating that military persons and civilians may be tried by
military commission); Green, supranote 15, at 848 (observing that persons subject
to military law, U.S. civilians, alien enemies and POWs may be tried by military
commission).
104. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 280-81 (setting forth "jurisdiction over
offense criterion" and explaining that offenses triable are violations of law of war,
civil crimes generally cognizable by civil courts if open and operating normally,
and violations of military orders and regulations not punishable by courts-martial);
see also WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 839-41 (same); DAvis, supra note 19, at 309-10
(stating that offenses are violations of law of war and civil crimes not tried because
civil courts are closed); FMARMAN, supra note 101, § 52 (noting that offenses are
violations of law of war, civil crimes generally cognizable by civil courts if open and

operating normally, and breaches of military regulations); 1901 JAG DIGEST, supra
note 101, § 1680 (stating that offenses are violations of law of war and civil crimes
not tried because civil courts are closed); Green, supra note 15, at 846-47 (asserting
that offenses triable are violations of law of war, violations of military orders and
regulations, and crimes committed in occupied territory).
105. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 281-86 (explaining 'jurisdiction over
place criterion" and noting that places consist of territory where military government is in effect, territory under martial law, and zone of operations); see also WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 836-37 (observing that places include territory under
military government, territory under martial law, and theatre of war, each of which
must be within field of command of convening authority); DAVIS, supra note 19, at
309 (stating that places consist of enemy territory under military government and
territory under martial law); FAivmAN, supra note 101, § 52 (observing that place
can be one of "profound peace" after Ex parte Quirin); 1901 JAG DIGEST, supra
note 101, § 1680 (noting that places include enemy territory under military government and territory under martial law); Green, supra note 15, at 847-48 (asserting that places include territory under military government and territory within
United States).
106. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 272 (describing effect of finding that military commission satisfies Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework).
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In addition to the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, any examination of the lawfulness of military commission jurisdiction must also consider Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,t 0 7 which set forth the seminal three-part test for separation of powers analysis. 10 8 Under the first category of Youngstown ("Category One"),
when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, the President has the maximum amount of authority for his
actions. 0 9 If that action is unconstitutional, it is usually because the fed10
eral government, as a whole, lacks the power to act in that manner.'
Under the second Youngstown category ("Category Two"), when the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or a denial of
authority, the President must rely solely on his own independent powers. 11' Here, congressional inaction or acquiescence might invite independent presidential action.1 12 Third, when the President takes measures
incompatible with Congress's expressed or implied will ("Category
Three"), the President's power is at its "lowest ebb" because the President
can rely solely on his own constitutional powers, and not on any power
113
Congress may possess.
IV.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S LEGAL POSITION

President Bush's Military Order subjects members of al-Qaeda to law
of war jurisdiction through military commissions.' 1 4 The Military Order
lists four sources of authority for convening law-of-war military commissions. 1 15 The first source of authority is the President's constitutional
107. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth
three-category framework). The President's powers "are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." Id. at
635.
108. See Neal K Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274-77 (2002) (discussing Justice
Jackson's three-category framework).
109. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (explaining "Category One" test).
110. See id. at 635-37 (discussing effect of Category One finding).
111. See id. at 637 (setting forth "Category Two" test). This test "is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law." Id.
112. See id. (explaining effect of congressional inaction).
113. See id. at 637-38 (setting forth "Category Three" test). Here, a court can
sustain the President's power only by disabling Congress from acting on the subject. See id. (noting that when President takes action inconsistent with will of Congress, his power is at its nadir).
114. See Military Order, supra note 5, § 1 (e), 3 C.F.R. at 918 (determining that
persons subject to Military Order will be tried for violating law of war); see asoJohn
M. Bickers, Military Commissions Are Constitutionally Sound: A Response to Professors
Katyal and Tribe, 34 TEx. TECH L. REv. 899, 909 (2003) (indicating that Military
Order asserts only law of war jurisdiction).
115. See Military Order, supra note 5, 3 C.F.R. at 918 (citing President's constitutional power, AUMF and UCMJ as authority for establishing law-of-war military
commissions).
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power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 1 16 The second
source of authority is the AUMF, which authorizes the use of military force
against those responsible for the September 11th attacks. 117 The third
source of authority is UCMJ Article 21, which gives military commissions
concurrent jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of
war.' 18 The last source of authority, UCMJ Article 36, allows the President
to prescribe the procedures for cases that are triable by military
9
commission.1
Thus, President Bush bases his power to convene law-of-war military
commissions on an amalgam of his constitutional authority and the power
delegated to him by Congress in the form of two statutes. 120 The Bush
administration's legal position vis-i-vis the "War on Terrorism" was the result of various memoranda prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice's
12 1
AlOffice of Legal Counsel (OLC) and other administration attorneys.
116. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (vesting Commander-in-Chief power in
President).

117. See AUMF, supra note 84, § 2(a) (authorizing use of force against alQaeda). Shortly thereafter, the United States took military action against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban regime that controlled Afghanistan. See President George W.
Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps
and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1201, 1201 (Oct. 7,
2001) (reporting military strikes).
118. See 10 U.S.C. § 821, which provides:
§ 821. Art. 21. Jurisdiction of courts-martial not exclusive
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courtsmartial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
119. See id. § 836, which states:
§ 836. Art. 36. President may prescribe rules
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post trial procedures, including modes of
proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts
of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall,
so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable and shall be reported to Congress.
120. See Military Order, supra note 5, 3 C.F.R. at 918 (enumerating constitutional and statutory bases of authority for creating law-of-war military
commissions).
121. The September l1th attacks presented the Bush administration with a
variety of novel legal questions, such as the scope of the detention, treatment,
interrogation and trial of persons captured in the "War on Terrorism," which resulted in many legal opinions and other official correspondence being produced,
many of which are in the public domain. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion from
John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy E.
Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, The President'sConstitutionalAuthority To
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25,
2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [hereinafter Sep-
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tember 25, 2001 OLC Opinion] (providing opinion regarding President's authority to take military action in response to September 11th attacks and concluding
that President has broad power); Memorandum Opinion from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel & Robert J. Delahunty, Special
Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President
& William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Authority for Use of Military
Force To Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States (Oct. 17, 2001) (not released publicly); Memorandum Opinion from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists (Nov. 6, 2001) (not
released publicly); Memorandum Opinion from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of
Defense, Possible HabeasJurisdictionover Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Dec.
28, 2001), available at http://www.msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/
011228_philbinmemo.pdf (finding it unlikely that U.S. courts have jurisdiction
over aliens filing habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Draft
Memorandum Opinion from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Application of Treaties and
Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), available at http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5032094/site/newsweek (finding that law of war treaties
do not apply to al-Qaeda or Taliban militia); Memorandum from William H. Taft,
IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Your Draft Memorandum ofJanuary 9 (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/OlTaftMemo.pdf
[hereinafter January 11, 2002 State Department Memorandum] (discussing concerns over POW status of Taliban detainees); Letter from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel,
Office of Legal Counsel, to William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State
(Jan. 14, 2002), available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/
02YooTaft.pdf (disagreeing with January 11, 2002 State Department Memorandum
arguing that Taliban detainees may be due POW protections); Memorandum
Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel,
Dep't of Defense, Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf [hereinafter January 22, 2002 OLC Opinion] (concluding that Third Geneva Convention did not apply to al-Qaeda); Memorandum from
William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to John C. Yoo, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Your Draft Memorandum ofjanuary 18
(Jan. 23, 2002), availableat http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/
03TaftYooGonzalez.pdf [hereinafterJanuary 23, 2002 State Department Memorandum] (arguing that Taliban detainees are entitled to POW status, at least as rebuttable presumption); Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, to the President, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at
http://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/gonzales-memo.pdf
(outlining
ramifications of President's status determinations and Secretary of State's request
for reconsideration); Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, to the
Counsel to the President & the Assistant to the President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs,
DraftDecision Memorandumfor the Presidenton the Applicability of the Geneva Convention
to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), available at http://msnbc.com/modules/newsweek/pdf/powell-memo.pdf (noting that President had not properly
been presented with opinions regarding Third Geneva Convention's application
to "War on Terrorism"); Letter Opinion from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to the
President (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/tor-
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ture/jash20lO2ltr.html [hereinafter February 1, 2002 Attorney General Opinion]
(presenting options to President Bush regarding application of Third Geneva Convention to Taliban detainees); Memorandum Opinion from James C. Ho, Att'yAdvisor, Office of Legal Counsel, to John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, Possible Interpretationsof Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisonersof War (Feb.1, 2002) (not released publicly); Memorandum from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State,
to the Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paperon the Geneva Convention
(Feb. 2, 2002), available at http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/politics/
20040608_doc.pdf (urging conclusion that Third Geneva Convention applies to
conflict with Taliban regime); Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/torture/bybee20702mem.html [hereinafter February 7, 2002 OLC Opinion] (concluding
Taliban militia cannot satisfy Article 4 of Third Geneva Convention); Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Potential Legal Constraints
Applicable to Interrogationsof Persons Capturedby U.S. Armed Forces in Afghanistan (Feb.
26, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/022602bybee.pdf [hereinafter February 26, 2002 OLC Opinion] (discussing legal constraints that may apply to interrogation of persons captured in
Afghanistan); Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to WilliamJ. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, The
President'sPower as Commander in Chief To Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control
and Custody of Foreign Nations (Mar. 13, 2002) (not released publicly); Office of the
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, White Paper (Mar. 22, 2002) (not released publicly but purportedly analyzing application of Third Geneva Convention to "War
on Terrorism"); Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 28,
2002),
available at http://www.cartoonbank.com/newyorker/slideshows/
05YooTaft.pdf (finding "significant points of disagreement" with State Department
over whether Afghanistan is "a failed state" and interpretation of Article 5 of Third
Geneva Convention); Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office
of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80lO2ltr.html (arguing that methods used for interrogation do not violate Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, S.TiRATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85); Memorandum Opinion from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/doj/bybee80lO2mem.pdf (discussing standards of conduct under Convention Against Torture); Memorandum from William J.Haynes II, Gen. Counsel,
Dep't of Defense, to the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force,
Working Group To Assess Legal, Policy, and OperationalIssues Relating to Interrogationof
Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Jan. 17, 2003), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/011703haynes.pdf
(appointing General Counsel of Air Force to head interdepartmental working
group addressing issues of detainee interrogation); Memorandum from Maj. Gen.
Jack L. Rives, DeputyJ. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Air Force, to SAF/GC, Final Report and
Recommendations of the Working Group To Assess the Legal, Policy and OperationalIssues
Relating to Interrogationof Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism
(Feb. 5, 2003), reprinted in 151 Cong. Rec. S8796 (daily ed.July 25, 2005) (recognizing tension within executive branch over limitations on interrogation techniques);
Memorandum from Maj. Gen.Jack L. Rives, DeputyJ. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Air Force,
to SAF/GC, Comments on Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group To
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763

though the administration did not formally adopt the Time-Person-OfAssess the Legal, Policy and OperationalIssues Relating to Interrogation of DetaineesHeld by
the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003), reprinted in id. at S8794
(noting further tension between Department of Justice, international community
and executive branch regarding legal limits placed on interrogation techniques);
Memorandum from Rear Adm. Michael F. Lohr, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Navy, to the
General Counsel of the Air Force, Working Group Recommendations Relating to Interrogation of Detainees (Feb. 6, 2003), reprintedin id. at S8795 (explaining desire to limit
legal conclusions to unlawful combatants held outside United States); Memorandum from Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Staff J. Advoc., U.S. Marine Corps, to
the General Counsel of the Air Force, Working Group Recommendations on Detainee
Interrogations(Feb. 27, 2003), reprinted in id. at S8794 (expressing concern for U.S.
servicemen dependent upon OLC's interpretation of international law); Memorandum from Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Army, to the General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force, Draft Report and Recommendations
of the Working Group To Access the Legal, Policy and OperationalIssues Related to Interrogation of DetaineesHeld by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism (Mar. 3, 2003),
reprinted in id. (fearing ramifications if Department of Defense was to sanction interrogation techniques that may appear to violate domestic and international law);
Memorandum from Rear Adm. Michael F. Lohr, J. Advoc. Gen., U.S. Navy, to the
Air Force General Counsel, Comments on the 6 March 2003 Detainee Interrogation
Working Group Report (Mar. 13, 2003), reprinted in id. at S8795 (reiterating numerous comments regarding concerns generated by working group report); Memorandum Opinion from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) (not
released publicly); U.S. Dep't of Defense, Working Group Report on DetaineeInterrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d20040622doc8.pdf (setting forth Department of Defense policy regarding detention of unlawful combatants held outside United States); Memorandum
Opinion from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to James B. Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
dagmemo.pdf (denouncing torture and intricately defining various elements that
constitute torture); Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense,
Memorandumfor Williamj Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, from
John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States (March 14, 2003) (Feb.
4, 2005), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/Levin.Haynes.205.pdf (confirming that OLC formally withdrew its Mar. 14, 2003 memorandum opinion); Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, to the Judge
Advocates General & the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, Department of
Defense InterrogationPolicy (Mar. 17, 2005), availableat http://balkin.blogspot.com/
Haynes.jag.305.pdf (determining that "Report of Working Group on Detainee Interrogations" should be considered historical document with no standing in policy,
practice or law to guide any activity of Department of Defense); Memorandum
Opinion from C. Kevin Marshall, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Proposed Amendments to Military Commission Order No. 1 (Aug. 12, 2005), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/militarycommissionchangesop(final).pdf
(concluding that
proposed amendments to Military Commission Order No. 1 are consistent with
Military Order); U.S. Dep't of Justice, White Paper, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the NationalSecurity Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf (arguing
that AUMF places President and Congress in Youngstown Category One position).
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fense-Place Framework, the framework provides a helpful structure for
analyzing the lawfulness of President Bush's law-of-war military
122
commissions.
A.

The Jurisdiction in Time Criterion

Under the first prong of the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, a
law-of-war military commission has jurisdiction in time only when a state of
war exists. 123 Therefore, the issue is whether the United States is "at war"
with al-Qaeda, as well as with the Taliban regime that controlled Afghanistan. 12 4 Historically, war has been defined as a "contest by force between
independent sovereign States." 125 Prior to the September lth attacks,
the United States viewed international terrorism primarily as a criminal
matter that necessitated a criminal-justice response. 12 6 This view changed
drastically following the carnage and economic damage wrought by the
September llth attacks and the United States' subsequent military
response. 127

Initially, commentators doubted whether a nation-state like the
United States could be at war with an amorphous, transnational terrorist
organization like al-Qaeda. 12 8 President Bush, however, determined that
the September l1th attacks were "on a scale that has created a state of
armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed
Forces."1 29 Moreover, the President later declared the armed conflict to
122. For a discussion of the Bush administration's legal position within the
Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, see infra notes 114-86 and accompanying
text.
123. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 273 (determining that state of war must
exist to obtain jurisdiction in time).
124. See id. (noting test for jurisdiction in time criterion).
125. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 295 (Richard
Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 8th ed., Boston, Little, Brown 1866) (defining "war"); accord
The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 652 (1863) (defining "war" as "the exercise of force by bodies politic, or bodies assuming to be
bodies politic, against each other, for the purpose of coercion").

126.

SeeJOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAw IN INTER-

296 (2004) [hereinafter MURPHY] (noting response of United
States to terrorism before September 11th attacks). But cf President William J.
Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Military Action Against
Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1464, 1464 (Aug. 21, 1998)
(informing Congress that U.S. military conducted military strikes against al-Qaeda
camps and installations in Afghanistan, in exercise of right of self-defense under
Article 51 of U.N. Charter).
127. See President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Meeting with the
National Security Team, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1100, 1100 (Sept. 12, 2001) ("The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were
more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.").
128. See MURPHY, supra note 126, at 168 (discussing concerns of some
commentators).
129. Military Order, supra note 5, § 1 (a), 3 C.F.R. at 918. Under the Constitution, the President can neither declare nor initiate war. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 11 (granting Congress power to "declare War"). The President, however, can
NATIONAL AFrARS
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be "international in scope." 130 Thus, the President concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which sets forth the minimum
requirements for the treatment of detainees in non-international armed
131
conflicts, did not apply to the global conflict with al-Qaeda.
The Bush administration's position was supported by (1) the actions
of Congress, (2) the opinions of the U.S. courts and (3) most segments of
the international community.1 3 2 First, when Congress enacted the AUMF
and authorized President Bush to use "all necessary and appropriate
force" against the organizations and persons who perpetrated the Septem133
ber llth attacks, Congress treated the conflict with al-Qaeda as a war.
As such, the Bush administration interpreted the AUMF as providing express legislative authority for prosecuting the global conflict with al-Qaeda,
which qualified the President's actions as falling under Category One of
Youngstown.13 4 Second, like Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the existence of a state of war in Afghanistan. 13 5 Third, various international organizations supported President Bush's view that a state of armed
conflict existed by concluding similarly that al-Qaeda committed an
"armed attack" upon the United States.13 6 Therefore, each branch of the
recognize the existence of a state of war. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at
641.
130. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush, Humane Treatment of
Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
2(c) (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/020702bush.pdf
[hereinafter Status Determination Memorandum] (finding conflict with Taliban regime to
be "international in scope"). Although President Bush has not determined formally that Article 2 of the Third Geneva Convention applies to the conflict with
the Taliban regime, this is necessarily the case. SeeJanuary 22, 2002 OLC Opinion,
supra note 121, at 31 (noting that if President denied Taliban militia members
POW status under Article 4 of Third Geneva Convention, President would be conceding conflict with Taliban regime falls within ambit of Article 2).
131. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130, 1 2(c) (determining Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions to be inapplicable to conflict
with Taliban regime).
132. See Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2047, 2060-69 (2005) [hereinafter Bradley
& Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization] (discussing effects of congressional action
and international community's response to September I 1th attacks).
133. See id. at 2060 (noting that "both Congress and the President have
treated this conflict as a war, and have treated the entities identified in the AUMF
as enemy combatants under the laws of war").
134. See September 25, 2001 OLC Opinion, supra note 121 ("[T]he President
can be said to be acting at the apogee of his powers [here], for he is operating
both under his own Article 1I authority and with the legislative support of Congress."); see also Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 2, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (U.S. Sept. 2005), available at http://www.nimj.org/documents/
HamdanBrief.opp.pdf (arguing that Congress supported President's use of force
against al-Qaeda via AUMF).
135. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(holding Congress authorized detention of enemy combatants through AUMF).
136. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization, supra note 132, at
2068-69 (noting that U.N. Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
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U.S. government, as well as a majority of the international community,
supported President Bush's conclusion that the September 11th
attacks
13 7
created a state of war between the United States and al-Qaeda.
With respect to the United States' use of force against the Taliban
regime that controlled Afghanistan in 2001, President Bush based his authority to wage war on the United Nations Charter and the AUMF.1 38 Specifically, President Bush used Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
which preserves a state's ability to use force in responding to an armed
attack, to justify the United States' use of force against the Taliban regime. 139 In addition, the President relied on the AUMF, which authorizes
the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations" that aided the September l1th attacks. 140 Consequently, according
to President Bush, the conflicts against both al-Qaeda and the Taliban re14
gime amounted to a state of war. '
B.

The Jurisdiction over Persons Criterion

For a law-of-war military commission to have jurisdiction over a person, that person must (1) be subject to the UCMJ as a POW or (2) be an
individual who has committed an unlawful act of war and is therefore amenable to law of warjurisdiction.142 Accordingly, the threshold issue is determining the legal status of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees. 143 UCMJ
Article 2 makes POWs subject to military law. 144 The Third Geneva Con14 5
vention, however, governs the criteria for POW status.
and Organization of American States treated September I 1th attacks as "armed
attacks" under United Nations Charter).
137. See id. at 2069 (concluding that United States is engaged in state of war
with al-Qaeda and Taliban regime).
138. See id. at 2068-69 (summarizing Bush administration's position).
139. See Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) (reporting that United
States and its allies had initiated actions in Afghanistan in exercise of inherent
right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of U.N. Charter, in
response to "armed attacks that were carried out against the United States" on
September 11, 2001).
140. See AUMF, supra note 84, § 2(a) (authorizing use of force).
141. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130,
2(c) (determining that conflicts with al-Qaeda and Taliban regime are "international in
scope").
142. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 274, 277-79 (stating that in order to obtain jurisdiction over person, that person must be subject to military law or be
someone who is otherwise subject to law of war).

143. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBL'N 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DICrIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 156 (2005) (defining "detainee" as
.any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force").
144. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (9) (subjecting POWs in custody of Armed Forces
to UCMJ).
145. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 87, arts. 2, 4-5.
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Articles 2, 4 and 5 of the Third Geneva Convention determine who
qualifies as a POW. 1 46 As a preliminary matter, Article 2 specifies that the
Third Geneva Convention applies only to cases of "declared war" or "any
other armed conflict which may arise" between two or more parties to the
convention. 147 Article 4 establishes the categories of persons entitled to
14
POW status. 8
Article 4(A) (1) applies to members of the armed forces of a party to a
conflict, as well as to members of militias or volunteer corps forming part
of those armed forces. 14 9 Under Article 4(A) (2), in order to qualify as a
POW, members of "other militias" and "other volunteer corps" must have
fallen into the power of the enemy, and fulfill four conditions: (1) be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (2) wear a distinc146. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 794 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that Articles 2, 4 and 5 of Third Geneva Convention "establish the standard for
determining who is a POW").
147. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 2 (describing conflicts
to which Third Geneva Convention applies).
148. See id. art. 4. For present purposes, only Articles 4(A) (1)-(3) are relevant, and read:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into
the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfill
the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
Id. In addition to the four criteria enumerated in Article 4(A)(2), some authorities contend that the there is an implicit, fifth criterion for lawful combatant status;
namely, that combatants serve at the direction of a government. Nurick & Barrett,
supra note 55, at 567-70 (arguing in favor of fifth criterion); accord Military Prosecutor v. Omar Mahmud Kassem, 42 I.L.R. 470, 476-78 (Israeli Mil. Ct. at Ramallah
1969) (same); Speed Opinion, supra note 16, at 301 ("The laws of war demand that
a man shall not take human life except under a license from his government.");
GREAT BRITAIN, WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw

28, at

291 (1914) [herein-

after MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw] (noting that "war must be conducted by persons
acting under the control of some recognized government, having power to put an
end to hostilities in order that the enemy may know the authority to which he may
resort when desirous of making peace").
149. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 4(A) (1) (defining
'POW").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 6
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: p. 737

ive sign recognizable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly and (4) conduct
operations in accordance with the law of war.1 5 0 Article 4(A) (3) applies to
members of the regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government that is not recognized by the detaining government. 15 1 Article 5
provides a mechanism for making individualized POW status determina152
tions if a detainee's status under Article 4 is in "doubt."
150. See id. art. 4(A)(2) (setting forth four conditions for POW status). A
person has fallen into the power of the enemy when he has been "captured by, or
surrendered to members of the military forces... who have taken him into cus64 (explaining manner in
tody." FM 27-10, supra note 18, 1 84(b); see also id.
which four conditions of Article 4(A)(2) may be satisfied). These four conditions
for lawful combatant status were first codified in the Hague Convention of 1899.
See Jeremy Rabkin, After Guantanamo: The War over the Geneva Convention, NAT'L
INT., Summer 2002, at 15, 20 (describing original promulgation of conditions as
resting "pre-eminently on practical considerations"); see also Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 1, July 29, 1899, 32
Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429 (enumerating four conditions of lawful combatant
status). These conditions were reaffirmed at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference.
See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 1,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]
(defining applicability of four conditions to belligerents). It appears that these
four conditions were first proposed in 1874. See United States v. Lindh, 212 F.
Supp. 2d 541, 557 n.34 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting criteria were first codified in 1874);
see also Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War art. 9, Aug. 27, 1874, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 96, 97-98 (Supp. 1907) (identifying
conditions of individuals subject to laws, fights and duties of war).
151. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 87, art. 4(A) (3) (noting that
POWs are also "[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power").
152. See id. art. 5, which provides, in relevant part:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of
the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been
determined by a competent tribunal.
Id. In 2004, Congress reaffirmed the principles of Article 5. See Ronald W. Reagan
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375,
§ 1091 (b) (4), 118 Stat. 1811, 2069 (2004) (explaining that when there is doubt as
to detainees' status, they are to be treated as POWs until their status is determined
by competent tribunal). Article 5 applies to any person not appearing to be entitled to POW status, who (1) has committed a belligerent act and (2) "asserts that
he is entitled to treatment as a [POW] or concerning whom any other doubt of a
71(b) (interpreting Article 5's relike nature exists." FM 27-10, supra note 18,
quirements). A "competent tribunal" of the United States "is a board of not less
than three officers acting according to such procedure as may be prescribed for
7
1(c). If a competent tribunal determines that a
tribunals of this nature." Id.
person does not fall within Article 4, that person is not entitled to POW privileges.
See id.
73 (describing result of adverse finding by competent tribunal); see also
U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES (1997) (setting forth
current policy, procedures and responsibilities respecting detainees in custody of
Armed Forces). In the "War on Terrorism," the United States determined "that
Article 5 tribunals were unnecessary because there is no doubt as to the status of
[the detainees]." SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
THE COMM-rEE AGAINST TORTURE, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.I/Annex, at
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President Bush's Status Determination Memorandum

On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum ("Status
Determination Memorandum") that declared the Third Geneva Convention inapplicable to al-Qaeda as a whole, and found that individual alQaeda detainees do not qualify as POWs under Article 4.153 Moreover,
54 (Jan. 13, 2006) [hereinafter SECOND PERIODIC REPORT] (explaining that Article
5 only applies where there is doubt as to belligerents' status).
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004), and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion), the Bush
administration established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which
"supplement the prior screening procedures and serve as fora for detainees to
contest their designation as enemy combatants and thereby the legal basis for their
detention." Id. The U.S. Department of Defense established the CSRTs by military
order. See Deputy Sec'y of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Order Establishing Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/
Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter CSRT Order] (creating CSRT Order to
improve management within U.S. Department of Defense concerning detention of
enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Memorandum from Gordon H.
England, Sec'y of the Navy, Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba (July 29,
2004), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040730comb.pdf (implementing CSRT Order). The CSRT Order defines an "enemy combatant" as "an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." CSRT Order, supra, at 1. The
CSRT process was completed in 2005. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CombatantStatus
Review Tribunal Summary (Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/
Mar2005/d20050329csrt.pdf (reporting that 520 of 558 detainees then-held at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were enemy combatants).
Separately, Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) annually review the detention of each Guantanamo Bay detainee to assess "whether an enemy combatant
continues to pose a threat to the United States or its allies, or whether there are
other factors bearing on the need for continued detention." SECOND PERIODIC
REPORT, supra, at 56 (explaining ARB review procedure). The U.S. Department of
Defense created the ARB procedure by military order. See Deputy Sec'y of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz, Order OSD 06942-04, Administrative Review Proceduresfor Enemy
Combatants in the Control of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
Cuba (May 11, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/
d200405l8gtmoreview.pdf [hereinafter ARB Order] (establishing ARB process to
assess annually need to detain enemy combatants held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba);
Memorandum from Gordon H. England, Designated Civilian Official, Implementation of Administrative Review Proceduresfor Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval
Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Sep2004/d200409l4adminreview.pdf (implementing
ARB Order). In 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense completed the first annual
ARB process. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, AdministrativeReview Board Summary (Feb.
2, 2006), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/Jan2006/d20060130arb.pdf (reporting final results of ARB-1 proceedings and indicating that 330 of 463 enemy
combatants then-held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba would continue to be detained).
153. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130,
2(a), 2(d)
(determining group status of al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda detainees); see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,126 S. Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7,
2005) (No. 05-184) (finding that al-Qaeda and individual al-Qaeda members do
not qualify as POWs). Although the Status Determination Memorandum was
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the President determined that the Third Geneva Convention applies to
the conflict with the Taliban regime, but that Taliban detainees as a group
do not qualify as POWs under Article 4.154 Finally, the President concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does not apply
to either al-Qaeda or Taliban detainees.1 5 5 The President based his status
determination upon two legal opinions, the first rendered by the OLC and
the second by the U.S. Attorney General.' 56
2.

The Legal Status of Al-Qaeda Detainees

In a January 22, 2002 legal opinion ("January 22, 2002 OLC Opinion"), the OLC determined that the Third Geneva Convention did not
apply to al-Qaeda for three reasons. 157 First, the OLC found that al-Qaeda
was not a state and therefore could not receive the benefits that a party to
the convention enjoys. 158 Second, the OLC reasoned that, even if the
Third Geneva Convention applied to the conflict with al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda
detainees failed to meet the POW criteria set forth in Article 4.159 Third,
dated February 7, 2002, it appears that President Bush first reached this decision
three weeks earlier. See Memorandum from Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Defense, to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and Al Qaida
(Jan. 19, 2002), available at http://www.dod.mil/news/un2004/d20040622docl.
pdf (directing transmittal of substantially similar status determination to U.S. combatant commanders).
154. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130, 11 2(b), 2(d)
(determining status of Taliban militia and Taliban detainees); see also United States
v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (upholding President Bush's
determination that Taliban militia and Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs).
155. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130, 2(c) (deciding Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions is not applicable to al-Qaeda or
Taliban detainees).
156. See id. 2 (reciting legal authority status determinations). It appears
that President Bush did not rely on the advice contained in the February 1, 2002
Attorney General Opinion. See id. (illustrating reliance on conclusions of U.S. Department of Defense and recommendations of U.S. Department of Justice).
157. SeeJanuary 22, 2002 OLC Opinion, supranote 121, at 9 (concluding that
Third Geneva Convention does not apply to al-Qaeda).
158. See id. (analyzing Article 2 of Third Geneva Convention and concluding
it does not apply to al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not high contracting party to
convention). By its terms, the Third Geneva Convention applies to cases of declared war or armed conflict between two or more high contracting parties. See id.
(explaining consequential inapplicability of provisions regulating detention of
POWs). Because al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization, and not a state, it cannot be a
high contracting party. See id. (noting that non-governmental organizations cannot be parties to international agreements governing law of war). As such, the
OLC argued that the Third Geneva Convention does not apply to the conflict with
al-Qaeda. See id.
159. See id. at 9-10 (reviewing Article 4 of Third Geneva Convention and asserting al-Qaeda detainees fail to satisfy POW eligibility requirements). As a
threshold matter, the opinion noted that Article 4 does not expand the application
of the Third Geneva Convention beyond the types of conflicts to which it applies.
See id. (explaining Article 4 does not expand Third Geneva Convention beyond
situations enumerated in Articles 2 and 3). Assuming arguendo, however, that Article 4 could confer POW status upon al-Qaeda detainees, the OLC found that the
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the OLC found that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not
1 60
As a reapply to the conflict between the United States and al-Qaeda.
sult, the OLC reasoned that al-Qaeda detainees could not qualify as POWs
as a matter of law. 16 1 Finally, the OLC concluded that because there was
no "doubt" as to al-Qaeda's collective status, no Article 5 tribunals were
necessary to determine individual al-Qaeda members' status; thus, according to the OLC, if the group, as a whole, cannot qualify under the Third
Geneva Convention, a fortiori, members of that group also cannot
16 2
qualify.
3.

The Legal Status of Taliban Detainees

Whether the Third Geneva Convention applied to Taliban detainees
was a more difficult question for the Bush administration. 16 3 Ultimately,
detainees could not fulfill Article 4's criteria. See id. at 10 (discussing reasons detainees would not enjoy POW protections). First, al-Qaeda does not qualify as the
armed forces, volunteer forces, or militia of a state party to the conflict; accordingly, Article 4(A)(1) does not apply. See id. (noting requisite status of party to
conflict under Article 4(A) (1)). Second, al-Qaeda detainees cannot qualify as part
of the volunteer force, militia or organized resistance under Article 4(A) (2) because they cannot fulfill the criteria applicable to such forces. See id. (explaining
that militia or volunteer forces must satisfy four conditions of Article 4(A) (2)).
Third, al-Qaeda members could not qualify as members of a regular armed force
that professes allegiance to a government or authority not recognized by the detaining power under Article 4(A) (3) because the same four criteria for lawful combatant status that apply under Article 4(A) (2) implicitiy apply to Article 4(A) (3).
See id. (reiterating requirement that four Article 4(A) (2) conditions apply to regular armed forces). With respect to Article 5, the OLC argued that because the
President found al-Qaeda, as a group, is not entitled to POW status under Article
4, no "doubt" arises and therefore no Article 5 tribunals are necessary. See id. at 3031 (recognizing that pursuant to President's power to interpret treaties, President
could determine that all Taliban forces fall outside scope of Article 4's definition
of POWs).
160. See id. at 10 (concluding nature of conflict precludes application of Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions). Here, the opinion asserted that Common
Article 3 does not apply to the conflict with al-Qaeda because it is a "conflict of an
international character." See id. (reasoning Third Geneva Convention applies to
either traditional wars between state parties or non-international civil wars).
161. See id. at 37 (restating conclusion that Third Geneva Convention does
not apply to al-Qaeda). That a person, as a matter of law, may not be entitled to
POW status does not preclude conferring those rights upon that person. See id. at
25-28 (asserting POW treatment can be, and has been, granted by United States as
matter of policy); see also FM 27-10, supra note 18, 70 (recognizing that enumeration of persons entitled to be treated as POWs is not exhaustive and "does not
preclude affording [POW] status to persons who would otherwise be subject to less
favorable treatment").
162. SeeJanuary 22, 2002 OLC Opinion, supra note 121, at 10 (discussing application of Article 5).
163. See id. (describing application of Third Geneva Convention to Taliban
militia as "a more difficult legal question"). In fact, there appears to have been
significant disagreement within the Bush administration in this regard. Compare id.
at 1 (concluding Third Geneva Convention inapplicable to Taliban detainees),
withJanuary 23, 2002 State Department Memorandum, supra note 121, at 2 (concluding Third Geneva Convention presumptively applied to Taliban detainees).
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President Bush determined that members of the Taliban militia were not
POWs because they did not satisfy Articles 4(A)(1)-(3), even though Afghanistan is a party to the Third Geneva Convention. 164 The January 22,
2002 OLC Opinion identified two theories supporting President Bush's
conclusion that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the
Taliban regime. 16 5 Under the first theory, President Bush could suspend
the Third Geneva Convention with respect to the Taliban regime, making
the convention inapplicable to the conflict. 166 Alternatively, the OLC argued, even if the Third Geneva Convention applied to the conflict with
the Taliban regime, Taliban members would not have to be classified as
POWs if President Bush reasonably determined they were not entitled to
POW status under Article 4.167 Here, the OLC declined to make a specific
POW-status determination, noting that it did not possess the requisite facts
1 68
to make such a categorical determination.
Consequently, the OLC prepared a second legal opinion ("February
7, 2002 OLC Opinion") specifically addressing the status of the Taliban
militia under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. 169 In this opinion, the OLC concluded that President Bush had reasonable factual
grounds for determining that no member of the Taliban militia was legally
entitled to POW status under Article 4.170 First, the OLC found that the
Taliban militia did not meet the requirements of Article 4(A) (2) because
it failed to satisfy at least three of the four conditions specified in that
provision. 1 7 Second, the OLC concluded that the Taliban militia, as a
164. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130,
2(b), 2(d)
(determining Third Geneva Convention inapplicable to Taliban detainees).
165. See January 22, 2002 OLC Opinion, supra note 121, at 10-25, 30-32
(presenting two theories why Third Geneva Convention is inapplicable to Taliban
militia).
166. See id. at 10-25 (explicating President Bush's suspension of Third Geneva
Convention based on "failed state" rationale).
167. See id. at 30-32 (offering possible bases for President Bush finding
Taliban militia not entitled to POW status under Article 4 of Third Geneva
Convention).
168. See id. at 31 (stating that OLC lacks requisite facts for categorical determinations of Taliban detainees' POW status).
169. See February 7, 2002 OLC Opinion, supra note 121, at 1 (summarizing
question presented).
170. See id. (finding President has "reasonable factual grounds to determine
that no members of the Taliban militia are entitled to [POW] . . . status").
171. See id. at 2-4 (concluding that President has power to determine that
Taliban militia is "categorically incapable of meeting" Article 4(A) (2)). First, the
opinion analyzed the first criterion of Article 4(A)(2) and concluded that the
Taliban militia could not satisfy that criterion because the Taliban militia had no
organized command and control structure through which members reported to a
military commander who took responsibility for their actions. See id. at 2. Next,
there was no evidence that Taliban members wore a distinctive uniform, meaning
that they failed to meet Article 4(A) (2) (b). See id. at 3. Further, while the Taliban
militia carried arms openly, as Article 4(A) (2) (c) requires, this fact did not sufficiently distinguish them from other Afghans, many of whom carry arms openly. See
id. Last, there was no indication that the Taliban militia considered itself bound by
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whole, failed to qualify for POW status under Articles 4(A) (1) and
4(A) (3).172 Here, the OLC reasoned that the four criteria enumerated in
Article 4(A) (2), which explicitly apply to militias and volunteer forces, implicitly applied to the references to "armed forces" in Articles 4(A) (1) and
4(A) (3).173 Third, the OLC determined there was no need to convene
Article 5 tribunals for individual status determinations, as the President
made a group status determination, thereby eliminating any "doubt" as to
the status of individual detainees. 174 Based on the OLC's analysis, President Bush determined that Taliban militia members, as a matter of law,
75
did not qualify as POWs.
C.

1

The Jurisdictionover Offense Criterion

For a law-of-war military commission to have jurisdiction over an of1 76
fense, the accused must be charged with a violation of the law of war.
17 7
The law of war comprises treaty law and customary international law.
Admittedly, Congress has neither defined the law of war nor specified the
the law of war; to the contrary, the Taliban militia committed many acts that are
considered violations of the law of war. See id. As a result, the OLC concluded that
the Taliban militia, as a whole, cannot meet the requirements of Article 4(A)(2).
See id. at 4.
172. See id. (asserting Taliban militia cannot qualify as POWs under Article 4).
173. See id. at 4-7 (finding four requirements of Articles 4(A) (2) implicitly
apply to Articles 4(A) (1) and 4(A) (3), thus Taliban militia would not qualify as
POWs under latter provisions). First, the opinion noted that the term "armed
forces" is not defined by the convention, and that Articles 4(A) (1) and 4(A) (3) do
not contain criteria similar to Article 4(A) (2), which groups must fulfill to achieve
POW status. See id. at 4. Next, the OLC argued that it would be illogical to read
the term "armed forces" as somehow relieving members of these armed forces
from the POW requirements applicable to militia members. See id. at 5. This
would create the possibility that a government could immunize its soldiers from all

POW requirements simply by defining them as members of the "armed forces." See
id.
174. See id. at 7-8 (concluding Article 5 tribunals were unnecessary because
President could make blanket Article 4 determination, thereby eliminating doubt
regarding status of Taliban detainees). The opinion first noted that, as a threshold
matter, Article 5 is triggered only if there is doubt as to a detainee's Article 4 status.
See id. at 8. Moreover, Article 5 tribunals are designed to determine whether a

particular detainee's factual circumstances fall within Article 4's categories, not

whether the group as a whole falls under Article 4. See id. Therefore, because the
President has the power to interpret treaties for the United States under Article II
of the Constitution, he reasonably could interpret the Third Geneva Convention
in a manner that would exclude Taliban members from Article 4's POW definition. See id. Accordingly, this determination would eliminate any doubt as to the
detainees' status, thereby obviating the need for Article 5 tribunals. See id.
175. See Status Determination Memorandum, supra note 130, 2(d) (determining Taliban militia did not qualify for POW status).
176. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 280 (suggesting need for allegation of
violation of law of war for military commission to obtain jurisdiction over offense).
177. See FM 27-10, supra note 18,
4 (indicating law of war is derived from
treaties and customary international law).
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precise punishment for its infraction. 178 Rather, Congress, for the most
part, has incorporated the law of war by reference into U.S. law under its
Article I power to "define and punish .

.

. Offences against the Law of

Nations." 179 Thus, to satisfy the jurisdiction over offense criterion, one
must determine whether the offense that a member of al-Qaeda or the
Taliban militia allegedly committed constitutes a violation of the law of
war. 180 The U.S. Department of Defense, charged with implementing the
Military Order, has enumerated a list of offenses against the law of war,
18 1
which forms the basis of the United States' prosecution efforts.
D.

The Jurisdiction over Place Criterion

For a law-of-war military commission to have jurisdiction over a particular place, the territory concerned must be within the "theatre or zone of
operations." 182 Consequently, the issue is whether the United States and
Afghanistan are territories within the theatre or zone of operations. l s A
theatre of operations is a place where war is being waged.' 8 4 It appears,
178. SeeExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942) (observing Congress's failure to
define what acts constitute offenses against law of war).
179. See id. ("Congress has incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which are defined as such by the law of
war.... ."). Congress has since seen fit to make certain war crimes punishable by
explicit statutory enactment. See War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441.
180. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 280 (arguing violation of law of war must
be alleged to obtain jurisdiction over offense).
181. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 2, Crimes
and Elements for Trials by Military Commission (Apr. 30, 2003), 32 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.6
(2005) [hereinafter Crimes and Elements] (defining offenses against law of war triable by President Bush's law-of-war military commissions). This instruction lists
thirty-three offenses that are punishable by military commission. See id. § 11.6.
Specifically, there are eighteen "war crimes": (1) willful killing of protected persons, (2) attacking civilians, (3) attacking civilian objects, (4) attacking protected
property, (5) pillaging, (6) denying quarter, (7) taking hostages, (8) employing
poison or analogous weapons, (9) using protected persons as shields, (10) using
protected property as shields, (11) torture, (12) causing serious injury, (13) mutilation or maiming, (14) use of treachery or perfidy, (15) improper use of flag of
truce, (16) improper use of protective emblems, (17) degrading treatment of a
dead body and (18) rape. See id. § 11.6(a). There are eight "other offenses triable
by military commission": (1) hijacking or hazarding a vessel or aircraft, (2) terrorism, (3) murder by an unprivileged belligerent, (4) destruction of property by an
unprivileged belligerent, (5) aiding the enemy, (6) spying, (7) perjury or false
testimony and (8) obstruction of justice related to military commissions. See id.
§ 11.6(b). In addition, there are seven "other forms of liability and related offenses": (1) aiding or abetting, (2) solicitation, (3) command/superior responsibility-perpetrating, (4) command/superior
responsibility-misprision,
(5)
accessory after the fact, (6) conspiracy and (7) attempt. See id. § 11.6(c).
182. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 282 (suggesting that territory within zone
of operations is sufficient to create jurisdiction over place).
183. See id. at 281-86 (setting forth test for jurisdiction over place criterion).
184. See Edmund M. Morgan, Court-MartialJurisdictionover Non-MilitaryPersons
Under the Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 107 (1920) (defining "zone of
operations").
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however, that Ex parte Quirin modified the jurisdiction over place criterion
insofar as it allows law of war jurisdiction to attach where actual peace
prevails, so long as the offense charged is an offense against the law of
war. 1 8 5 With respect to Afghanistan, the Bush administration asserts that
Afghanistan is an active theatre of operations because the Armed Forces
are currently engaged in an armed conflict there against both al-Qaeda
186
and the remnants of the Taliban regime.

V.

ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S LEGAL POSITION

A.

Consistency with the Time-Person-Offense-PlaceFramework

President Bush's law-of-war military commissions satisfy the traditional
18 7
Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, as modified by Ex parte Quirin.
First, the jurisdiction in time criterion is met because each of the three
coordinate branches of government recognized that the September l1th
attacks created a state of war between the United States and al-Qaeda, and
between the United States and the Taliban regime. 188 This state of war
continues because the United States still considers itself to be at war with
al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, which means the jurisdiction in time
criterion remains satisfied.1 89
Second, President Bush's law-of-war military commissions satisfy the
jurisdiction over persons criterion because all al-Qaeda detainees and certain Taliban detainees are not POWs but unlawful combatants. 190 AlQaeda is not a party to the Third Geneva Convention and thus cannot
claim its protections.1 91 Even if the Third Geneva Convention applied to
al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda detainees would not meet its POW requirements because they fail to conform to the rigid requirements of Article 4(A) (2). 192
Moreover, al-Qaeda detainees would not qualify as POWs under Article
4(A)(1) or 4(A)(3) because they do not satisfy the four conditions for
185. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 278-79 (explaining that Quirin modified
'zone of operations" requirement ofjurisdiction over place criterion); see also FAIRMAN,supra note 101, § 52 (noting that after Quirin, law of war violations can occur
in places of "profound peace").
186. See SECOND PERIODIC REPORT, supra note 152, at 48 (declaring that
"United States and its coalition partners are engaged in a war against al-Qaida, the
Taliban, and their affiliates and supporters") (emphasis added).
187. For a discussion of how President Bush's law-of-war military commissions
are consistent with the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, see infra notes 188200 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
189. See SECOND PERIODIC

REPORT,

supra note 152, at 48 (declaring United

States currently at war with al-Qaeda).
190. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184) (finding that al-Qaeda detainees
are not POWs).
191. See id. (noting al-Qaeda is not party to Third Geneva Convention).
192. See id. at 40-41 (holding al-Qaeda fails Article 4(A) (2) of Third Geneva
Convention).
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lawful belligerency. 193 Taliban detainees, on the other hand, are presumptively POWs under Article 4(A) (3) of the Third Geneva Convention
because they are members of the "regular armed forces" of an authority
entitled to indinot recognized by its detaining power and are therefore
19 4
vidual Article 5 hearings to determine their status.
Third, President Bush's law-of-war military commissions meet the jurisdiction over offense criterion because the list of offenses promulgated
by the U.S. Department of Defense constitute generally recognized violations of the law of war. 19 5 Offenses against the law of war have not been
193. See February 7, 2002 OLC Opinion, supra note 121, at 4-7 (explaining
four conditions of Article 4(A) (2) and applying them to al-Qaeda members).
While the question of whether the four conditions of Article 4(A)(2) implicitly
apply to Articles 4(A) (1) and 4(A) (3) is debatable, the better view is that the conditions do apply. See id. at 4 (determining that four conditions do apply). For
example, the British government so interpreted Article 1 of the Hague Regulations, as did the International Committee of the Red Cross in discussing Article 4
of the Third Geneva Convention. See MANUAL OF MILITARY LAw, supra note 148,
28, at 240 (noting that "[i]t is taken for granted that all members of the army as a
matter of course will comply with the four conditions [of Article 1 of the Hague
Regulations]; should they, however, fail in this respect they are liable to lose their
special privileges of armed forces") (citations omitted); INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

12

AUGUST

1949:

COMMENTARY

III,

GENEVA

62-63 (Jean S.
Pictet ed., 1960) (stating that "regular armed forces" of Article 4(A) (3) have all
material characteristics and attributes of "armed forces" of Article 4(A)(1) and
that drafters of Third Geneva Convention were "therefore fully justified in considering that there was no need to specify for such armed forces the requirements
stated" in Article 4(A) (2) (a)-(d)).
194. SeeJanuary 11, 2002 State Department Memorandum, supra note 121, at
11 (arguing Taliban militia presumptively qualifies for POW status under Article
4(A) (3) of Third Geneva Convention).
195. See Crimes andElements, supra note 181, at 32 C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.6 (enumerating law of war offenses triable by President Bush's law-of-war military commissions). Five types of charges have been referred to military commissions. See
generally U.S. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions-Charge Sheets, available at
(last visited May 26,
http://www.dod.mil/news/Nov2004/charge-sheets.html
2006) (collecting charges preferred against detainees). The five charged offenses
are (1) conspiracy to commit the following offenses triable by military commission:
attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, murder by an unprivileged belligerent, destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent and terrorism; (2) murder by an unprivileged belligerent; (3) attempted murder by an unprivileged
belligerent; (4) aiding the enemy; and (5) attacking civilians. See id. The Army
appears to recognize conspiracy as an offense against the law of war triable by
military commission. See FM 27-10, supra note 18, 82 (noting persons who conspired to commit hostile or belligerent acts are subject to death penalty); id. 500
(stating that conspiracy to commit war crimes is punishable). This is consistent
with historic Army practice. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF
THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY: 1912, at 1071 (1912) (listing "conspiracy by two or more to violate the laws of war by destroying life or property in
aid of the enemy" as violation of law of war punished during Civil War); see also
WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 839 (recognizing that "criminal conspiracies" were
punishable by military commission during Civil War and citing examples). One
prominent Civil War precedent involved a conspiracy to release Confederate
POWs confined near Chicago, Ill. and lay waste to the city. See generally GEORGE ST.
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
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codified definitively by Congress and therefore "need not be stated with
the precision of a common law indictment." 1 96 Deliberately attacking civilians and fighting out of uniform, however, are well-known offenses
19 7
against the law of war, traditionally punishable by military tribunals.
Finally, President Bush's law-of-war military commissions satisfy the jurisdiction over place criterion because both the United States and Afghanistan constitute "zones of operations." 198 The U.S. Supreme Court, in
Quirin, found that the United States qualified as a zone of operations during World War II, and the Court concluded similarly that Afghanistan is a
theatre of military operations by virtue of the September 11th attacks.' 99
Further, after Quirin and Hamdan, it appears that law of war offenses can
occur in locations of profound peace, not just in a theatre or zone of
200
operations.
H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 39-50 (2d Sess. 1867) (printing transcript of
military commission proceedings and related orders). The military commission
found the defendants guilty of conspiracy to violate the law of war, and both the
Judge Advocate General of the Army and the President of the United States upheld this finding. See Letter from Joseph Holt, J. Advoc. Gen., to the President
(June 29, 1865), reprintedin 8 WAR OF THE REBELLION, supra note 48, ser. 2, at 684
(opining that military commission trial was lawful); General Court-Martial Orders,
No. 452, War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, Aug. 22, 1865,
reprinted in id. at 724 (confirming and commuting sentence of George St. Leger
Grenfel). In addition to the Civil War, it appears that conspiracy to violate the law
of war was triable by military commission during the Philippine Insurrection,
World War II and the Korean War. See, e.g., Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, General
Orders, No. 339, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P.I., Nov. 6,
LEGER GRENFEL,

1901, at 4 (on file with author) (setting forth "a few of the well-established principles of law and procedure in cases of conspiracy" for "the future guidance of military commissions"); Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Letter Order, File AG 000.5 (24 Sep
45) JA, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific, Subject: Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals, Sept. 24, 1945,
5(a) (on file with
author) (making "all other offenses against the laws or customs of war" and "participation in a common plan or conspiracy to accomplish any of the foregoing" punishable by military commission); U.N. Command, Rules of Criminal Procedure for
Military Commissions of the United Nations Command (Oct. 22, 1950) (on file
with author), and reprinted in 60 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAw
STUDIEs 564, 565 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979) (granting military commissions jurisdiction over "all attempts to commit, or conspiracies and agreements to commit, as
well as inciting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, or permitting violations of the laws
and customs of war of general application").
196. In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946) (discussing law of war offenses).
197. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-37 (1942) (enumerating certain law of
war offenses).
198. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, 281-86 (examining jurisdiction over place

criterion).
199. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (plurality opinion) (indicating that military operations are ongoing in Afghanistan); FAiRmAN, supra note
101, § 52 (noting law of war offenses can occur in location of "profound peace"
such as United States).
200. See Kaplan II, supra note 93, at 279 (noting effect of Quiin on jurisdiction over place criterion).
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Consistency with JudicialMilitary Commission Precedent

In addition to satisfying the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework,
President Bush's law-of-war military commissions are consistent with U.S.
Supreme Court precedent. 20 ' Opponents of President Bush's military
commissions offer a two-prong constitutional law assault. 20 2 First, they argue that Milligan holds that it is unconstitutional to conduct military trials
of civilians in the United States while the civil courts are open and functioning, thus precluding the trial of members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban
militia. 203 Second, opponents contend that Quiin,which would appear to
support the Bush administration's position, does not control because it is
distinguishable from the "War on Terrorism" in three material respects:
(1) Congress formally declared war during World War II, but in the "War
on Terrorism" Congress has merely authorized the use of force; 20 4 (2) the
UCMJ superseded the Articles of War, which governed the Quiin military
commission; 20 5 and (3) the United States, since Quiin, has ratified the
Geneva Conventions of 1949, which preclude military commission
20 6
jurisdiction.
Neither Milligan nor Quiin, however, preclude trial by a law-of-war
20 8
military commission. 20 7 Milligan is inapposite here for three reasons.
First, Milligan was a U.S. citizen detained and tried in the United States. 20 9
The Military Order, however, applies only to non-citizens. 2 10 Second, Milligan was not a belligerent and was therefore not amenable to law of war
201. For an analysis of the case-law and international law ramifications on the
legality of President Bush's law-of-war military commissions, see infra notes 20247
and accompanying text.
202. See Bickers, supra note 114, at 902-06 (analyzing challenges to military
commission jurisdiction).
203. See id. at 904-05 (noting some commentators argue Milligan prohibits use
of military commissions when civil courts are open).
204. See Katyal & Tribe, supra note 108, at 1284-85 (arguing that lack of declaration of war distinguishes Quirin military commission from Military Order's law-ofwar military commissions). But cf Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 249, 254-55 (2002) (contending declaration of war distinction is immaterial).
205. SeeJack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 274-76 (2002)
(analyzing UCMJ statutory objections to President Bush's law-of-war military
commissions).
206. See id. at 277-78 (noting international law objections to President Bush's
law-of-war military commissions).
207. See Bickers, supra note 114, at 906, 910-12 (arguing Milligan was irrelevant to "War on Terrorism" and Quiin supports President Bush's law-of-war military commissions).
208. For a discussion of Milligan's inapplicability to President Bush's law-ofwar military commissions, see infta notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
209. SeeExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942) (recognizing Milligan's status as
U.S. citizen).
210. See Military Order, supra note 5, § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 919 (excluding U.S.
citizens from Military Order's ambit).
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jurisdiction. 2 11 In contrast, members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban militia
are belligerents because they are engaged in armed conflict against the
United States. 2 12 In fact, the QuirinCourt distinguished Milligan primarily
on this ground.2 1 3 Further, the Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld reaffirmed this
21 4
distinction, noting that Quirin both "postdates and clarifies" Milligan.
Third, Milligan's military commission acted without statutory recognition
and directly contravened then-existing law placing it under Category
2 15

Three of Youngstown.

President Bush, however, is acting pursuant to UCMJ Article 21,
which provides explicit statutory recognition of military commissions, in
addition to UCMJ Article 36 and the AUMF.21 6 Therefore, like the Quirin
military commission, President Bush's law-of-war military commissions
have ample statutory support, placing them under the rubric of Category
One of Youngstown. 2 17 Thus, President Bush's military commissions are
consistent with judicial military commission precedent.
C.

Consistency with Domestic and InternationalLaw

President Bush asserts that the Constitution, the AUMF and UCMJ
Articles 21 and 36 authorize him to employ law-of-war military commissions in the "War on Terrorism."2 18 Significantly, the Bush administration
appears to contend that the President has inherent constitutional power
to try violations of the law of war by military commission.2 19 Historically,
211. See December 2, 1969 Department of the Army Memorandum, supra
note 97, at 3 (noting that Milligan dealt with martial law, not law of war,
jurisdiction).

212. See Military Order, supra note 5, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 918 (recognizing
existence of state of armed conflict).
213. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (distinguishing Milligan).
214. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522-24 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(discussing relevance of Quirin and accepting Quirin as good authority "on the
question of whether citizens may be detained" as enemy combatants).
215. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140 (1866) (finding military

commission violated Habeas Corpus Act).
216. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S.Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184) (holding Congress authorized mili-

tary commissions via UCMJ Article 21).
217. See id. (finding same statutory authority exists today as existed when Quirin decided).
218. See Military Order, supra note 5, 3 C.F.R. at 918 (citing President's constitutional power, AUMF and UCMJ as authority for convening law-of-war military
commissions).
219. See February 26, 2002 OLC Opinion, supra note 121, at 5 (stating that
military commissions are "entirely creatures of the President's authority as Commander in Chief under Article II and are part and parcel of the conduct of a
military campaign"). Historically, the executive branch has construed the Commander-in-Chief Clause as a substantive grant of authority to the President. See
Memorandum Opinion from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Charles W. Colson, Special Counsel to the President, The President and the War Power: South Vietnam and the Cambodian Sanctuaries 5 (May 22,
1970), in White House Special Files: Staff Member & Office Files: Charles W. Col-
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numerous commentators have supported this view. 220 The Supreme
Court, however, is unlikely to determine the inherent authority issue
presented in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, much like it declined to answer this issue
in Quifin. 2 21 Rather, the Court will likely decide Hamdan based on the
222
AUMF, the UCMJ and international law.
The AUMF authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
223
planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11 th attacks.
Unlike in World War II, the United States is not fighting a war that formally has been declared by Congress against a nation-state. 224 The weight
of authority, however, suggests that distinctions between declarations of
war and authorizations for the use of force are immaterial. 225 Moreover,
the trial of enemy combatants who have violated the law of war is "part of

son; Box 43; Folder 1 of 2: Cambodia; Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, Nat'l
Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md. (opining that it is "reasonably clear
that the designation of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
is a substantive grant of power, and not merely a commission which entitles him to
precedence in a reviewing stand").
220. See, e.g., CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIvE IN THE

UNITED STATES 147 (1921) ("Military commissions, deriving their authority and
jurisdiction from military usage and the common law of war, and their creation,
composition, procedure, and decisions being subject to the complete control of
the Executive, are therefore, even more than courts-martial, merely agencies of the
Executive in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief."); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 258 (4th rev. ed. 1957) ("Punishment of
the [Quirin] saboteurs was therefore within the President's power as Commanderin-Chief in the most elementary, the purely martial, sense of that power."); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

109 (Richard P.

Longaker ed., expanded ed. 1976) (1951) ("[T]he military commission is wholly
the creature of the commander in chief or of one of his ranking officers in the
field.... Their jurisdiction, composition, procedure, and powers are for the President alone to determine and supervise.").
221. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942) ("It is unnecessary for present
purposes to determine to what extent the President as Commander in Chief has
constitutional power to create military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation.").
222. See id. (stating that issue was whether President and Congress, acting together, could try persons by military commission).
223. See AUMF, supra note 84, § 2(a) (authorizing use of force against alQaeda).
224. CompareJ. Res. of Dec. 11, 1941, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796 (declaring war on
Germany in World War II), with AUMF, supra note 84, § 2(a) (authorizing use of
force against al-Qaeda).
225. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184) (dismissing argument that
declaration of war is necessary); accord Bradley & Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization, supra note 132, at 2128 ("[A] declaration of war is not required in order for
Congress to authorize the President to fully prosecute a war; a broadly worded
authorization of force is sufficient.").
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the conduct of war," which Congress may be assumed to have authorized
226
via the AUMF.
Under UCMJ Article 21, military commissions have "concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of
war may be tried by military commissions." 227 The Quirin Court interpreted UCMJ Article 21's predecessor statute, Article of War 15, to "au2 28
thorize"-not merely recognize-the use of military commissions.
Thus, subject to the limitations imposed by the law of war, Congress has
2 29
sanctioned the use of military commissions to try enemy combatants.
President Bush's law-of-war military commissions are also consistent
with the international law of war, as incorporated into U.S. law by UCMJ
Article 21.230 "Treaties made.., under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." 231 Thus, international law-specifically, the Third Geneva Convention-may limit the use of military commissions. 23 2 The Third Geneva Convention, however, does not create
judicially enforceable rights. 233 Nevertheless, even if the Third Geneva
Convention is judicially enforceable, al-Qaeda detainees and certain members of the Taliban militia could not claim its protection because they are
not POWs but unlawful combatants. 2 34 Thus, the Third Geneva Convention's prohibitions do not apply to the trial of al-Qaeda members or cer2 35
tain members of the Taliban militia found not to be POWs.
Accordingly, President Bush's law-of-war military commissions are also
consistent with the Third Geneva Convention and the international law of
23 6
war.
226. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 37-38 (noting trial of enemy combatants for law
of war violations is incident to waging war).
227. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (giving military commissions concurrent jurisdiction
over law of war offenses).
228. See Bradley & Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization, supra note 132, at
2130 (noting Quirin Court held Congress "authorized" military commissions to try
law of war offenses, not merely "recognizing" their historical use by President).
229. See id. (suggesting that international law may limit use of law-of-war military commissions).
230. For a discussion of how international law limits the use of President
Bush's law-of-war military commissions, see infra notes 231-36 and accompanying
text.
231. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (making treaties supreme law of land).
232. See Bickers, supra note 114, at 922 (noting that international law limits
jurisdiction of law-of-war military commissions).
233. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S.Ct. 622 (U.S. Nov. 7, 2005) (No. 05-184) (holding Third Geneva Convention is not judicially enforceable).
234. See id. at 40-42 (holding al-Qaeda detainees are not POWs).
235. See id. at 41 (finding Third Geneva Convention inapplicable to alQaeda); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding Taliban militia and Taliban detainees do not qualify as POWs).
236. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 40-42 (upholding lawfulness of particular law-ofwar military commission despite international law challenge).
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UCMJ Article 36 allows the President to prescribe trial procedures for
military commissions, which must apply the principles of law and rules of
evidence generally recognized in criminal trials before the U.S. district
23 7
courts, unless the President does not consider it "practicable" to do so.
In the Military Order, President Bush concluded it was "not practicable to
apply in military commissions . . .the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts."238 Despite this finding, military commission procedures "may not be contrary to or inconsistent with" the UCMJ. 239 Here,
two schools of thought have emerged. 2 40 Under the first school of
thought, military commissions must comply with all procedural requirements applicable to courts-martial under the UCMJ. 24 1 Under the second
school of thought, however, military commissions only must comply with
those few provisions of the UCMJ that Congress expressly made applicable
242
to military commissions.
The second school of thought is the better view for three reasons.
First, Congress took pains to distinguish between courts-martial and military commissions throughout the UCMJ, and Congress's will should be
24 4
respected.2 43 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in Madsen v. Kinsella,
which was decided two years after the UCMJ was adopted, found that military commission procedures were not prescribed by statute. 2 45 Third, if
the same procedural requirements were applicable to both courts-martial
and military commissions, there would be no need for military commissions, as the two species of tribunals would be identical. 246 Thus, military
commissions need only comply with the procedural requirements that the
24 7
UCMJ expressly makes applicable to military commissions.
237. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (permitting President authority to use discretion
in applying rules of U.S. district courts to military tribunals as long as rules are not
.contrary to or inconsistent with" UCMJ).
238. Military Order, supra note 5, § 1(f), 3 C.F.R. at 918 (making UCMJ Article 36 findings).
239. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a).
240. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 42 (noting differing interpretations of UCMJ
Article 36).
241. See id. (summarizing first school of thought regarding UCMJ Article 36).
242. See id. at 42-43 (explaining second school of thought vis-a-vis UCMJ Article 36).
243. See id. at 42 (acknowledging differences in UCMJ between courts-martial
and military commissions).
244. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
245. See Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 43 (discussing Madsen).
246. See id. at 42 (theorizing that first school of thought would "obliterate"
any distinction between courts-martial and military commissions).
247. See id. at 43 (stating conclusion regarding UCMJ Article 36). The UCMJ
refers to military commissions in nine instances. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 828, 836,
847-850, 904 and 906. A UCMJ Article 36 separation of powers objection may be
raised that the President is usurping Congress's Article I power to "define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations" by promulgating substantive
crimes triable by military commission. See Crimes and Elements, supra note 181, at 32
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D.

Youngstown and ConstitutionalLimitations

Although President Bush's law-of-war military commissions satisfy the
Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework and are consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and domestic and international law, the issue remains
whether Congress and the President can try persons by military commission after Youngstown, without regard to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 24 8 In the Military Order,
President Bush is acting pursuant to both his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the congressional power delegated to him through the AUMF and UCMJ. 249 Because the President
and Congress are acting in concert, President Bush's law-of-war military
250
commissions should be analyzed under Category One of Youngstown.
C.F.R. §§ 11.1-11.6 (enumerating law of war offenses triable by President Bush's
law-of-war military commissions). Opponents contend that UCMJ Article 36 gives
the President the power to establish "procedures," not the power to define offenses
against the law of war. Nevertheless military commissions have always operated
based on the common law of war which, by definition, is not precisely codified.
Surely, the Bush administration cannot be penalized for attempting to provide
clarification of what the United States considers to be violations of the law of war.
In contrast to its opponents, the Bush administration contends that the law of war
offenses enumerated "constitute violations of the law of [war] or offenses that,
consistent with that body of law, are triable by military commission," which are also
"declarative of existing law." Id. at 32 C.F.R. § 11.3(a). This practice appears to be
consistent with historical Army custom. See FM 27-10, supra note 18,
505(e)
("[D]irectives declaratory of international law may be promulgated to assist [military] tribunals in the performance of their function.").
248. See Kaplan I, supra note 33, at 143 (noting Constitution may limit trials by
military commission).
249. See Military Order, supranote 5, 3 C.F.R. at 918 (listing legal authority for
establishing President Bush's law-of-war military commissions).
250. See Bradley & Goldsmith, CongressionalAuthorization, supra note 132, at
2130 (indicating Quirin Court held Congress authorized military commissions to
try law of war offenses). Congress, moreover, has not passed legislation circumscribing President Bush's authority, but generally has tried to augment that authority. See, e.g., DTA, supra note 84, § 1005(e) (3) (providingjudicial review of military
commissions); Military Commissions Act of 2005, H.R. 3044, 109th Cong. (2005)
(amending UCMJ to provide standards for use of military commissions for trial of
offenses under law of war); Guantanamo Detainees Procedures Act of 2005, H.R.
3038, 109th Cong. (2005) (affirming authority of executive branch to detain foreign nationals as unlawful combatants and providing for President to establish military tribunals to try such persons); Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R.
1076, 109th Cong. (2005) (authorizing President to detain enemy combatant who
is U.S. person or resident, and who is member of al-Qaeda or knowingly cooperated with members of al-Qaeda); Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005,
S. 12, 109th Cong. (2005) (reciting U.S. policy of providing individualized hearings for all detainees for purpose of expeditiously holding them accountable for
violations of law of war); Military Commissions Act of 2004, H.R. 5222, 108th Cong.
(2004) (amending UCMJ to provide standards for use of military commissions for
trial of offenses under law of war or in furtherance of international terrorism);
H.R. Con. Res. 472, 108th Cong. (2004) (expressing sense of Congress that apprehension, detention and interrogation of terrorists are fundamental elements in
successful prosecution of global "War on Terrorism" and protection of lives of
United States citizens at home and abroad); Military Tribunal Regulations Review
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Hence, under Youngstown, the Constitution itself must preclude trial by
military commission in order for President Bush's law-of-war military com25 1
missions to be found unconstitutional.
Neither Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution nor the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments preclude trial by military commission. 252 The Fifth
Amendment applies to "all persons" and prohibits the trial of non-military
persons outside of the civilian court system. 2 53 There are two theories for
excluding violations of the law of war from the Fifth Amendment's ambit.2 54 Under the first view, "trials for offences against the laws of war are
not embraced or intended to be embraced" by the Fifth Amendment,
thereby making the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to military commission
trials. 255 Under the second view, because the Fifth Amendment excludes
"cases arising in"-as opposed to "persons in"-the land or naval forces,
persons who violate the law of war are not entitled to the protections of
the Fifth Amendment. 2 56 In Quiin, the Court endorsed the first view,
holding the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to military commissions beAct, H.R. 2428, 108th Cong. (2003) (providing for congressional review of regulations relating to military tribunals); Military Tribunals Act of 2003, H.R. 1290,
108th Cong. (2003) (authorizing President to establish military tribunals to try terrorists responsible for September l1th attacks); Detention of Enemy Combatants
Act, H.R. 1029, 108th Cong. (2003) (granting President power to detain enemy
combatant who is U.S. person, or resident who is member of al-Qaeda, or knowingly cooperated with members of al-Qaeda); Justice Enhancement and Domestic
Security Act of 2003, S. 22, 108th Cong. (2003) (permitting President to establish
tribunals to try members of al-Qaeda who have violated law of war); Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, H.R. 4035, 107th Cong. (2002) (authorizing President to establish military tribunals to try terrorists responsible for September 1 th
attacks); Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2002, S. 1941, 107th Cong. (2002)
(same); Military Commission Procedures Act of 2002, S. 1937, 107th Cong. (2002)
(setting forth certain requirements for trials and sentencing by military commissions); Foreign Terrorist Military Tribunal Authorization Act of 2001, H.R. 3468,
107th Cong. (2001) (authorizing President to convene military tribunals for trial
of persons other than U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens who are apprehended in connection with September 1 1th attacks).
251. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining method of analyzing actions taken by President and Congress acting in concert under Category One).
252. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942) (concluding Fifth and Sixth
Amendments do not apply to military commissions).
253. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V (guaranteeing that "[n]o person shall be held
to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces" and
that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law").
254. See Morgan, supra note 184, at 90-107 (setting forth competing schools of
thought regarding Fifth Amendment).
255. See Speed Opinion, supra note 16, at 313 (advancing first species of Fifth
Amendment argument).
256. See Halleck, supra note 26, at 963-67 (setting forth argument based on
Fifth Amendment's excepting clause); Morgan, supra note 184, at 97-107 (evaluating excepting clause argument).
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cause the civil courts, at common law, did not try war-related offenses. 25 7
Thus, under Supreme Court precedent, the Fifth Amendment provides no
2 58
constitutional bar to trial by military commission.
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment does not preclude trial by military
commission. 2 59 The Sixth Amendment requires a jury trial in all criminal
prosecutions; yet, unlike the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment
does not except members of the Armed Forces. 2 60 The Milligan Court
held the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the Armed Forces. 26 1 Thus,
because the Fifth Amendment does not apply to trials by military commission, the Sixth Amendment is also inapplicable. Consequently, military
commission trials are consistent with the Constitution and Supreme Court
2 62
precedent.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Historically, law-of-war military commissions have been considered appropriate tribunals for adjudicating offenses against the law of war com257. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40-41 (finding Fifth Amendment not intended to
apply to trials by military commission). Here, the Court noted that spies have long
been amenable to trial by Army court-martial. See id. at 41-42. In addition to this
Army practice, Congress also provided for the trial of spies by U.S. Navy courtsmartial. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 24, art. 35, 1 Stat. 709, 712 (making spies
amenable to trial by court-martial); Act of Apr. 23, 1800, ch. 33, art. 12, 2 Stat. 45,
47 (same); Act of'July 17, 1862, ch. 204, art. 4, 12 Stat. 600, 602 (same); Rev. Stat.
§ 1624, art. 5 (2d ed. 1878) (same); 34 U.S.C. § 1200, art. 5 (1926) (same). Today,
spies are no longer considered violators of the law of war, but are punished severely in order "to render that method of obtaining information as dangerous,
difficult, and ineffective as possible." FM 27-10, supra note 18, 1 77 (stating Army
position vis-A-vis spies). See generally David A. Anderson, Spying in Violation of Article
106, UCMJ: The Offense and the Constitutionality of Its Mandatory Death Penalty, 127
MIL. L. REv. 1, 4-36 (1990) (tracing history of spying offense).
258. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (holding Fifth Amendment inapplicable to trials by military commission). In Hamdan, however, the Supreme Court may conclude that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause does apply to trials 'by
military commission, "particularly in view of the expanded scope which the Supreme Court has given . . . to those fundamental rights which the due process
clause guarantees to all criminal defendants." Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S.
Dep't of Defense & U.S. Dep't of the Army, OTJAG, Military Justice, Military Commissions 14 (1970) (on file with author) (analyzing lawfulness of using military
commissions to try law of war offenses); accord Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
509 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding due process clause applicable to detention
of U.S. citizen held as enemy combatant).
259. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (holding Sixth Amendment inapplicable to
trials by military commission).
260. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (guaranteeing accused jury trial in criminal

cases).
261. See Ex parteMilligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866) ("[T]he framers of
the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth
amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in
the fifth.").

262. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (holding Sixth Amendment inapplicable to
trials by military commission).
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mitted by nation-state enemies. 263 Congress, the President and the U.S.
Supreme Court consistently have upheld the military commission's jurisdiction. 264 The changes in domestic and international law that have occurred since World War II have limited-but not eliminated-military
26 5
commission jurisdiction over offenders against the law of war.
In keeping with the American tradition, any extension of military jurisdiction over non-military persons must be strictly construed, and the
Constitution and laws obeyed. 266 In this unconventional war with both
the al-Qaeda terrorist network and the Taliban regime, President Bush
complied with both the Constitution and the laws by basing his Military
Order on the President's inherent constitutional power and the power
Congress delegated to him under the UCMJ and the AUMF. 267 Because

today's military commissions are consistent with Colonel Winthrop's TimePerson-Offense-Place Framework, and because they comport with the Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court precedent and domestic and international
law, military commissions remain an appropriate forum to try law of war
violations in the ongoing "War on Terrorism." 268 In brief, the military
commission has once again answered its nation's call to duty and, if endorsed again by the U.S. Supreme Court, undoubtedly will be a valuable
tool for the United States in its battle against global terrorism. In the process, the military commission also reaffirms the fact that the "maxim inter
269
armas silent leges is never wholly true."
Haridimos V Thravalos

263. See WINTHROP, supra note 15, at 832-34 (discussing traditional use of military commissions).
264. See Kaplan I, supra note 33, at 125 (noting all three branches of federal
government have recognized propriety of using military commissions to try law of
war violations).
265. For a discussion of the effects of post-World War II changes in military
commission jurisdiction, see supra notes 201-25 and accompanying text.
266. See

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (lodging

grievance against King George III for rendering "Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power").
267. See Military Order, supra note 5, 3 C.F.R. at 918 (reciting bases of authority for establishing President Bush's law-of-war military commissions).
268. For a discussion of President Bush's law-of-war military commissions vis-dvis the Time-Person-Offense-Place Framework, the Constitution, U.S. Supreme
Court precedent and domestic and international law, see supra notes 187-240 and
accompanying text.
269. Speed Opinion, supra note 16, at 301. The maxim, often attributed to
Cicero, means "in war the law is silent." DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra

note 18, at 31.
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